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ABSTRACT 
 
 The positive theory of litigation predicts that, under certain 
conditions, plaintiffs and defendants achieve an unremarkable 
and roughly equivalent share of litigation success.  This Article, 
grounded in an empirical analysis of WTO adjudication from 
1995 through 2007, reveals a high disparity between 
Complainant and Respondent success rates: Complainants win 
roughly ninety percent of the disputes.  This disparity 
transcends Case Type, Party Identity, Income Level, and other 
litigant-specific characteristics.  After analyzing and discarding 
standard empirical and theoretical alternative explanations for 
the systematic disparity in success rates, this study 
demonstrates, through an examination of patterns in WTO 
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adjudicators’ notorious decisions, that biased rule development 
explains this disparity.  This Article then discusses the effect of 
biased rule development on perceptions of the WTO dispute 
settlement system’s democratic legitimacy and legality.  (JEL: K 
33, K 41)   
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[I]t is the Membership which through its appointments will ex ante 
ensure that the quality of Appellate Body reports will be preserved.   
Ex post, the civic community discusses the activities of the WTO 
adjudicating bodies and through its writings gives or denies its vote of 
confidence.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In ordinary litigation, one expects any pattern in judicial 
decisions to reflect the balance of the strength of plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ cases.  Absent information asymmetries or different 
stakes among plaintiffs and defendants, long-term trends in favor of 
one type of litigant do not occur.  Each party’s preference for (or 
aversion to) litigation adjusts to cues emanating from the litigation 
environment.2  Indeed, the prevailing positive theory of judicial 
adjudication explains that it is unlikely for a particular type of 
litigant to systematically prevail over time because stronger cases 
will settle rather than result in full adjudication.3  With the mortality 
of such strong cases thus accounted for, litigation assumes an 
unpredictable nature, where decisions favoring plaintiffs are just as 
likely as those favoring defendants.4  As no particular trends emerge 
under these circumstances, litigation becomes the realm of 
randomness.  However, where trends in judicial decisions favoring a 
particular type of litigant emerge, and the above assumptions hold, 
such trends might be viewed as the product of transformational shifts 
in the law.  If an investigation into the nature of the law being made 
in the adjudicatory process indicates that this process increasingly 
benefits one particular type of litigant, one must consider whether the 
discrepancy in success rates is the result of biased rule development, 
or even the product of conscious judicial effort.5   
                                                                                                                      
 1. Petros Mavroidis & Thomas Cottier, The Role of the Judge in International 
Trade Regulation: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 1, 2 (Thomas Cottier & Petros 
Mavroidis eds., 2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of 
Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1071–73 (1989).   
 3. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (1984).  
 4. Id. at 17–20. 
 5. See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., The Quiet Revolution 
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 503 
(1990) (discussing trends in decision making); Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, 
and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33, 35 (2006) (discussing unbiased 
rule evolution).   
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 Do the insights applicable to ordinary litigation extend to the 
domain of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute system?  The 
creation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) represented a 
major shift in the legal conception of trade disputes.6  The political, 
consensus-based system of dispute settlement, prevalent during the 
“GATT years,” gave way to a rule-based, litigation-driven architecture 
designed to strengthen the multilateral trading system by providing 
both final and legally enforceable decisions.7  While the DSB retained 
GATT’s sovereign-nation-centered arrangement, the shift in legal 
philosophy has brought it closer to the characteristics of ordinary 
systems of litigation.  For instance, principles such as finality, basic 
due process, and adherence to established rules on legislative and 
“judicial” jurisdiction form the bedrock of both the DSB and other 
court-based systems.8  This similarity in fundamental characteristics 
to ordinary litigation allows the application of the existing theory to 
the class of disputes thus far presented to the DSB.  As this system 
has been in place for more than a decade, having decided disputes 
affecting more than thirty-three of its member countries in over one 
hundred cases, there is now sufficient data to determine if the 
standard model’s theoretical expectations can also be verified in the 
outcomes of these disputes.9   
 Of course, any attempt to extend the standard model of litigation 
to DSB disputes must account for specific constraints unique to WTO 
litigants.  First, because sovereigns must respond to competing 
domestic political concerns, they may not be subject to the same 
incentives or pressures as litigants in domestic adjudication.  
However, WTO members, like corporations and other 
multidimensional litigants, can and do aggregate preferences and are 
able to express their balanced or consensus-driven choices in a unified 
manner.  That the WTO’s basic rules and the operation of the 
international system impose constraints on members’ ability to settle 
disputes has been suggested as an important distinction between 
                                                                                                                      
 6. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 264 (4th ed. 2002).   
 7. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, 
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193 
(1996) (describing the results of the Uruguay Round). Compare General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] 
(demonstrating the consensus-based GATT system), with Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 2(4), Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].   
 8. See generally JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 246–64 (examining the 
transition from the GATT dispute settlement system to the DSB). 
 9. See WTO Dispute Settlement—Chronological List of Dispute Cases, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009) (listing the disputes brought before the DSB and the countries involved).  
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WTO dispute settlement and ordinary litigation.10  Specifically, 
Guzman and Simmons theorize that the coexistence of parallel 
international commitments and the unavailability of certain typical 
settlement options deriving from the operation of the Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) principle depress settlement activity in WTO 
litigation.11  While a definite feature of WTO litigation, settlement 
constraints do not seem to have a significant impact on members’ 
litigation behavior, as will be demonstrated later in the study.   
 After conducting a thorough examination of all disputes 
submitted to the DSB, this Article shows that WTO litigation does 
not conform to the ordinary model’s prediction that no trends will 
develop in favor of a particular party.12  In fact, a sustained pattern of 
Complainant success across all categories of disputes (e.g., trade 
remedy and non-trade remedy), regardless of Complainant-specific 
characteristics (e.g., country identity, and level of income) or product-
type (e.g., commodities and noncommodities), indicates that WTO 
litigation results are far from symmetric.  This Article then attempts 
to explain why there is a consistently high rate of Complainant 
success in WTO dispute resolution.  Arguably, this pro-Complainant 
WTO trend might be understood as the result of the violation of the 
model’s general assumption of zero settlement-related transaction 
costs.  However, while the low frequency of settlement activity might 
positively impact the rate of Complainant wins, its overall effect is 
not strong enough to explain the trend favoring one particular type of 
litigant over the other.   
 This Article proposes that the pro-Complainant tendency 
prevailing in all forms of WTO adjudication is likely the result of 
biased rule development.  Specifically, it theorizes that the DSB has 
evolved WTO norms in a manner that consistently favors litigants 
whose interests are generally aligned with the unfettered expansion 
of trade.  While it is quite uncontroversial that an adjudicatory 
system engaged in interpreting trade-liberalizing standards would 
tend to favor free trade,13 the presence of particular, consistent 
patterns in these interpretations raises concerns about the system’s 
adherence to the negotiated terms of the agreements, especially with 
respect to Respondents’ reserved regulatory competencies.  Although 
the limited number of fully adjudicated WTO disputes requires some 
degree of caution in interpreting empirical results, the combination of 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An 
Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 
(2002). 
 11. Id. at 210–11. 
 12. Since only WTO members can be parties to WTO disputes, this Article uses 
the terms “party” and “member” interchangeably. 
 13. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 333 (1999). 
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sustained, highly asymmetric adjudication outcomes with WTO 
adjudicators’ adoption of a pro-Complainant stance in numerous 
decisions supports the conclusion that WTO adjudicatory outcomes 
are the result of biased rule development.   
 Part II of this Article briefly outlines the operation of the DSB.  
Part III examines prior literature on WTO litigation.  Part IV 
presents discussions on the data, methods, and empirical results of 
all filed and fully adjudicated disputes.  Part V discusses whether 
various alternative empirical and theoretical explanations could 
account for the general pattern of observed results.  Among these, the 
study addresses the potential impact of case selection and provides an 
evaluation of the extent to which the high Complainant success rate 
can be explained by the transaction costs associated with settling.  
Part VI proposes biased rule development as the explanation for the 
discrepancy in Complainant and Respondent success rates through 
an examination of decision patterns reflected in a number of cases.  
While this Article does not claim to resolve every competing 
empirical, theoretical, or normative explanation for DSB results, 
analysis of these decisions tends to support prior anecdotal studies 
alleging that WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body have 
interpreted the WTO agreements in a manner that consistently 
promotes the goal of expanding trade, often to the detriment of 
Respondents’ negotiated and reserved regulatory competencies.   
II.  OPERATION OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 To ensure that bargained-for trade concessions (e.g., tariff 
reductions, elimination of nontariff barriers, and market access) are 
not frustrated by members’ adoption of trade-restrictive measures, 
the WTO agreements provide a mechanism of binding dispute 
settlement.14  Under the supervision of the DSB, on which each WTO 
member sits, panels and the Appellate Body deliberate and make 
rulings on disputes submitted by members.15  Specifically, where 
either a panel or the Appellate Body finds that a challenged member’s 
measure “nullifies or impairs” another member’s “benefits accruing” 
under one of the “covered agreements,” the adjudicator prepares a 
final report and then submits it to the DSB for formal adoption.16  
                                                                                                                      
 14. DSU, supra note 7, arts. 1(1), 7(2), 22(3). By the express language of GATT 
1994 Article 1(a), the provisions of GATT remain effective “as rectified, amended or 
modified by the terms of the” more recent WTO agreements. General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, art. 1(a), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 15. DSU, supra note 7, art. 2(1). 
 16. Id. art. 10(4); see also GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII (discussing the 
implications of nullification and impairment).   
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Following DSB adoption, the offending country must eliminate the 
noncompliant measure and bring its practices into compliance with 
the ruling.17  Failure to comply triggers the possibility of suspension 
of concessions on the part of the prevailing member.18  However, 
suspension of WTO obligations vis-à-vis the offending member is 
generally the exception—the mere possibility of countermeasures 
provides a substantial incentive for compliance.19   
 Among the substantive norms used to gauge whether a measure 
amounts to a “nullification” of another member’s rights, the most 
important are the MFN principle, the national treatment principle, 
and the nondiscrimination principle.  These norms generally prohibit 
discrimination among goods and services imported from or provided 
by any member and proscribe any discrepancy in the treatment of 
foreign and domestic goods and services.20  For example, under the 
MFN principle, any advantage or beneficial treatment extended to 
one member in regard to border measures (e.g., tariff rules or customs 
practices) must be extended to all other WTO members.21  These 
three basic pillars of WTO law, however, extend to areas beyond 
border measures, such as internal taxes and regulations pertaining to 
internal transportation, distribution, and sale.22  In sum, members 
cannot adopt measures that either facially or in effect discriminate 
among foreign-origin products or favor domestic products.23  Due to 
the importance of these broad principles to trade liberalization, 
numerous GATT/WTO agreements effectively mirror these 
provisions.24   
                                                                                                                      
 17. DSB adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports is largely a formality. To 
date, the DSB has adopted every final panel or Appellate Body report. World Trade 
Organization, Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, Appellate Body Reports, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009); cf. John Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and 
Must Be Fixed, 37 INT’L LAW. 697, 744–45 (2003) (discussing the lack of legitimacy and 
democratic participation in the DSB). 
 18. DSU, supra note 7, art. 22(3); GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII. 
 19. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 257–59. 
 20. See GATT, supra note 7, arts. I, III, XIII (discussing the MFN principle, the 
national treatment principle, and the nondiscrimination principle). 
 21. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, art. II, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
GATS]; GATT, supra note 7, art. I. 
 22. See GATT, supra note 7, art. III. 
 23. GATT, supra note 7, art. III; see GATS, supra note 21, art. IV. 
 24. See, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
art. 3, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM Agreement] 
(prohibiting subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods); GATT, 
supra note 7, arts. III, V, X, XI (discussing freedom of transit, transparency in the 
administration of trade regulations, general prohibition against quantitative 
restrictions, and transparency respectively). 
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 Such broad requirements are also subject to qualified exceptions.  
Specifically, members have retained the GATT-based right to apply 
offsetting tariffs to “dumped”25 or impermissibly subsidized products 
that cause material injury to domestic producers.26  A set of strong 
public policy exceptions was also preserved from the GATT years.  
Among these exceptions are measures deemed necessary to protect 
public morals,27 measures relating to conservation of natural 
resources,28 and emergency trade restrictions that safeguard a 
member’s balance of payments.29  Historically, these deviations from 
free trade were meant to facilitate further rounds of trade 
liberalization by giving the contracting governments the public policy 
space within which to maneuver through adjustments owing to 
decreasing levels of tariffication.30  Members must justify these 
departures from the broad principles of free trade, however.  These 
permissible deviations strike a complex balance between members’ 
needs to countervail trade-distorting policies and their potential 
protectionist relapses.   
 Building upon these broad GATT principles, the Uruguay Round, 
which culminated in the creation of the WTO in 1994, gave birth to 
new obligations and reciprocal rights.  New multilateral agreements 
created additional trade disciplines and international standards in 
areas such as sanitary measures (SPS Agreement),31 intellectual 
                                                                                                                      
 25. Generally, “dumping” refers to the practice of selling products in the 
importing market at prices lower than their “normal value” (e.g., home market price, 
where available). See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement]. 
 26. See GATT, supra note 7, art. VI(2); see also Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
supra note 25, art. 9; SCM Agreement, supra note 24, art. 5. 
 27. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(a). 
 28. Id. art. XX(g). 
 29. Id. arts. V, XII. 
 30. Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law, 38 
J. WORLD TRADE 1, 3–4 (2004).  
The task of postwar institutional reconstruction . . . [was] to devise a 
framework which would safeguard and even aid the quest for domestic stability 
without, at the same time, triggering mutually destructive external 
consequences that had plagued the interwar period.  This was the essence of 
the embedded liberalism compromise . . . . 
John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 393 (1982).  
 31. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, pmbl., Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
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property rights (TRIPS),32 technical barriers to trade (TBT 
Agreement),33 and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS).34  
These additional disciplines were meant to go beyond the traditional 
tariff liberalization context and refocused the WTO in the direction of 
trade harmonization across new regulatory areas.35  For example, a 
member’s otherwise permissible discriminatory health measure may 
run afoul of the new regulatory harmonization provisions contained 
in the SPS Agreement if it is not based on scientific evidence.36  Thus, 
where a member’s regulation would previously have been upheld as a 
justified incidental restriction on trade by, for example, reliance on a 
GATT exception, it may no longer be acceptable due to additional 
restrictions imposed by these new trade harmonizing agreements.  It 
is within this legal framework that WTO litigation takes place.   
III.  THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON WTO ADJUDICATION OUTCOMES 
 Scholars have written extensively on WTO dispute settlement.  
Discussion has focused on the manner in which it functions, how its 
decisions are enforced, and its implications on international and 
domestic law.  A large portion of the trade literature applauds the 
operation of the DSB as a force in promoting a stable, rules-based 
international trade regime.  A number of trade scholars, however, 
have criticized the dispute settlement system for exhibiting an 
alleged bias in favor of a particular version of free trade.   
 Most articles advancing such critical views have focused on case-
specific examples.  For instance, Tarullo examines the Appellate 
Body’s application of the standard of review in cases brought under 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, pmbl., Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 33. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, pmbl., Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
 34. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, pmbl., 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf [hereinafter TRIMS 
Agreement]. 
 35. See Heiskanen, supra note 30, at 16–17 (discussing SPS, TBT and TRIPs 
agreements). 
 36. SPS Agreement, supra note 31, art. 2(2); see, e.g., Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
¶ 180, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC—Beef 
Hormones]. 
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the Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement.37  Tarullo focuses on disputes 
arising under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, which contains a 
provision requiring application of a Chevron-like standard of review 
when considering challenges to domestic agencies’ AD decisions.38  
After reviewing all Appellate Body decisions adopted between 1995 
and 2001 that interpret and apply this standard, Tarullo concludes 
that, with the exception of one case, the Appellate Body failed to 
apply the level of deference mandated by the AD Agreement.39  
Tarullo offers a series of explanations for why the Appellate Body 
failed to apply the correct AD standard of review.  Chief among these 
is the notion that the Appellate Body is furthering the WTO 
preference for free trade40 by attempting to establish a significant 
role for itself in shaping the law on international trade.41  Noting 
other arguments for and against the Appellate Body’s actions, Tarullo 
considers whether the refusal to apply the negotiated standard will 
have a negative impact on further rounds of international trade 
negotiations.  He suggests that countries, particularly those with 
larger economies such as the United States, might be unwilling to 
enter into further trade-liberalizing agreements if they perceive the 
DSB system as pursuing an activist role by disregarding negotiated 
standards.42   
 Another anecdotal study, written by Ragosta, Joneja, and 
Zeldovich, is equally critical of WTO dispute settlement.43  The study 
focuses on WTO cases involving trade remedy disputes and concludes 
that WTO panels and the Appellate Body have been engaged in a 
process of judicial activism creating a WTO “common law.”44  
Specifically, the DSB has read obligations into trade disciplines 
where no such obligations exist.45  The authors suggest that such 
judicial activism is a result of structural problems within the system, 
including the binding nature of the dispute settlement system, the 
unclear and ambiguous substantive provisions of the WTO 
agreements, the lack of democratic oversight of the Appellate Body 
                                                                                                                      
 37. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: 
WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 112 
(2002). 
 38. Id. To the non-U.S. audience, Chevron is the short-name reference to a 
famous U.S. Supreme Court decision that announced a seemingly agency-deferential 
canon of statutory interpretation. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).  Although not exactly identical, the language of Article 
17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (discussed in Part VI.A below) resembles that of 
the Chevron canon. 
 39. Tarullo, supra note 37, at 147. 
 40. Id. at 153. 
 41. Id. at 159. 
 42. Id. at 176. 
 43. Ragosta et al., supra note 17, at 698. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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and the panels, and the absence of procedural protections in the 
system.46  Endorsing Tarullo’s theory, the authors assert that this 
combination of factors undermines faith in the WTO system and 
threatens support for additional liberalization in coming rounds of 
negotiations because the sovereigns involved cannot predict the 
consequences of their agreements.47   
 In contrast to these critical studies, most empirical scholarship 
praises the operation of the DSB.  Such scholarship has produced 
either general descriptive statistical analyses of dispute outcomes or 
hypothetico-deductive studies on specific theories, such as the 
selection of defendants in WTO cases and the likelihood of settlement 
of disputes.  Even where empirical analysis supports the critiques 
offered in the anecdotal studies previously discussed, most empirical 
authors look favorably at these results, viewing them as evidence that 
the WTO dispute settlement system functions according to its design 
and purpose.  Thus, disagreement on whether these trends are 
beneficial or detrimental to the advancement of a rules-based 
international trade regime remains.   
 Among the descriptive statistical studies, Hudec presents the 
most comprehensive analysis of GATT dispute outcomes from 1948 to 
1989.48  Hudec seeks to determine how effectively the GATT system 
responded to “legally valid complaints.”49  After examining 
complaints by decade, party type, and identity and agreement type, 
Hudec concludes that the GATT dispute settlement procedure 
successfully resolved a high percentage of disputes (88% overall) in 
favor of complaints based on legally valid claims.50  His data also 
indicates that the GATT dispute settlement system was more 
responsive to the interests of stronger countries, which, according to 
Hudec, is natural in a young legal system.51  Hudec also finds that 
complaints involving agricultural trade are equally successful as 
complaints involving nonagricultural trade.  Finally, Hudec’s analysis 
shows that Antidumping and Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) cases 
have a higher percentage of legal failure and a low rate of 
settlement.52  He suggests that “the typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD 
criteria and the legal rigidity of the measures once taken might . . . 
have given them a greater than average chance of failure” and posits 
that “the ascension of AD/CVD measures to a place of importance in 
                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. at 706. 
 47. Id. at 699. 
 48. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 273 (1993). 
 49. Id. at 274. 
 50. Id. at 353. 
 51. Id. at 353–54. 
 52. Id. at 355. 
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national trade policy might . . . be a sign of other, deeper tendencies 
toward noncompliant behavior.”53 
 Hudec would later extend his empirical work to an examination 
of the outcomes of challenges brought against members’ measures 
during the early years of the DSB’s operation.54  Hudec first observes 
a dramatic increase in the volume of cases and proposes two possible 
explanations for this increase.55  Relying on the fact that developed 
and less developed countries had increased their complaint activity 
more or less equally, Hudec postulates that the increase in case 
volume was a result of the WTO members’ confidence in the new 
system’s ability to remove trade restrictions.56  He also indicates that 
the increase in case volume is also related to the increase in the legal 
obligations arising from the creation of new WTO agreements.57  
Hudec’s second major finding is a threefold increase in the percentage 
of cases brought against developing countries.58  He posits that this 
increase is the result of the successful effort in the Uruguay Round to 
impose legal discipline on developing countries.59  To Hudec, the 
growth in the use of the dispute settlement mechanism by all parties 
is a welcome development toward strengthening trade as a rules-
based system.60   
 Building on Hudec’s work, Davey conducts a survey of the WTO 
dispute settlement system in its first ten years of operation.61  He 
focuses largely on the success of “major users” of the WTO dispute 
settlement system in achieving their goals of enforcement of specific 
agreements or trade policies.62  “Major users” are the United States, 
the European Communities (EC), Canada, Japan, Brazil, and India.63  
Davey examines the outcomes achieved when the “major users” 
invoke the system, as well as the constraints the system places on 
them as a result of initiation of proceedings by other WTO 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Id. 
 54. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An 
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3 (1999). 
 55. Id. at 15, 17. 
 56. Id. at 22.  But see Marc L. Busch et al., Does Legal Capacity Matter? 
Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping Actions in the WTO 1 (Int’l Ctr. for 
Trade & Sustainable Dev. Programme on Dispute Settlement, Issue Paper No. 4, 2008), 
available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/12/legal-capacity.pdf (theorizing that LDCs 
are actually less likely to bring claims at the WTO due to a weaker legal capacity).   
 57. Hudec, supra note 54, at 17. 
 58. Id. at 24. 
 59. Id. at 24–25. 
 60. Id. at 23.  
 61. Note that Davey looks at “disputes,” which begin at the request for 
consultations.  See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First 
Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 18 (2005) (discussing disputes from 1995 through 
1999). 
 62. Id. at 25. 
 63. Id. 
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members.64  For example, Davey concludes that the United States 
has been “quite successful” in using the WTO system to effectively 
enforce two particular interests of U.S. trade policy: the TRIPS 
Agreement and the SPS Agreement.65  However, as a Respondent, the 
U.S. experience has been mixed in that the special standard of review 
negotiated by the U.S. for AD cases has not been reflected in the 
outcomes of cases; however, Davey argues that such losses have not 
noticeably constrained the U.S. from imposing safeguards and 
antidumping and countervailing duties.66   
 Dunoff also conducts a brief overview of the U.S. experience 
under the WTO dispute settlement system.67  He acknowledges that 
the United States has appeared either as Complainant, Respondent, 
or a third party in more disputes than any other WTO member68 and 
argues that, as a Complainant, the U.S. “has been successful in 
virtually all of the cases it has pursued seriously.”69  Dunoff asserts 
that the U.S. has complied with many of the adverse reports when it 
appears as Respondent and that many of the cases the U.S. lost were 
of relatively minor economic or political importance.70  To Dunoff, 
U.S. compliance with WTO decisions reflects the U.S. perception that 
the DSB and the WTO system of trade rules maximize U.S. economic 
interests.71  He does not discuss how U.S. losses as Respondent might 
affect such conclusions.   
 The other type of empirical analysis, the hypothetico-deductive 
study of WTO outcomes, attempts to empirically verify theories 
regarding the operation of the WTO dispute settlement.  Some 
studies focus on explaining specific features of dispute settlement 
rather than formulating an overarching theory of WTO litigation.  
For example, Guzman and Simmons conduct an empirical analysis of 
settlements from the WTO’s inception in 1995 through 2000.  They 
hypothesize that, when the subject matter of a dispute is of an “all or 
nothing” character, leaving little room for compromise, the parties are 
less likely to settle.72  If the subject matter of the dispute is more 
flexible (e.g., tariff rates), however, the parties are more likely to 
negotiate a settlement.73  From their data, the authors draw several 
conclusions.  First, democracies are less likely to settle cases of an “all 
                                                                                                                      
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 26. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The United States and International Courts and Tribunal 
24 (Temple Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2007-08, 2007). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 26. 
 71. See id. at 28. 
 72. Guzman & Simmons, supra note 10, at 206. 
 73. Id. 
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or nothing” character.74  Second, democracies are significantly more 
likely to resort to review by panels.75  Finally, the authors conclude 
that transaction costs, such as domestic political ramifications and 
legal fees associated with pursuing a case, rather than legal culture 
or a high comfort level with the “rule of law,” better account for 
patterns of settlement in WTO adjudication.76 
 A more recent study seeks to explain the overall high success 
rate of Complainants at the WTO.  Maton and Maton analyze the 
history of WTO disputes from its creation through 2004 in an attempt 
to determine whether members influence the outcomes of dispute 
settlement proceedings politically rather than through legal 
argument.77  They first hypothesize that the greater the 
Complainant’s economic power and previous use of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), the more likely it is that the 
decision will favor the Complainant.78  Second, they hypothesize that 
the EC and the United States are more likely to be successful than 
other members because of their “disproportionate political leverage” 
in international trade.79  Finally, they examine the effect of third-
party participants and hypothesize that the presence of third parties 
with greater economic power and prior litigation experience increases 
the likelihood of Complainant success.80  In reporting their results, 
the authors first confirm that Complainants have a higher success 
rate (80% of all disputes) than Respondents.81  They note that 
Complainants win 81.9% of panel rulings and 78.4% of Appellate 
Body decisions.82  They further report that the United States and the 
EC have higher than average success rates at the panel level (92%).83  
However, their statistics show that the Respondent success rates of 
the United States and the EC (19% and 21%, respectively) do not 
match their Complainant success rates, and that these rates are 
comparable to the average success rate of all Respondents (18%).84  
The authors then report that the variables of economic power, 
previous participation in the system, or participation of third parties 
do not have a statistically significant effect on the high Complainant 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Id. at 227. 
 75. Id.   
 76. Id. 
 77. John Maton & Carolyn Maton, Independence Under Fire: Extra-Legal 
Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 317 
(2007). 
 78. Id. at 325–26. 
 79. Id. at 326. 
 80. Id. at 328.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 329. 
 84. See id. at 329 tbl.1. 
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Success Rate at the WTO.85  They conclude by suggesting that further 
research incorporating a wider range of variables is necessary to 
explain the high Complainant Success Rate at the WTO.86 
 While it seems clear from these works that general trends can be 
detected in the operation of the dispute settlement system, there is no 
consensus on whether these trends will have a positive or negative 
impact on the future of the WTO and the international trade regime 
generally.  For example, unlike Tarullo, Trachtman argues that WTO 
dispute resolution is the appropriate forum for clarifying key issues 
arising under the agreements, which the parties themselves have 
decided not to solve at the negotiating stage.87  He supports this 
assertion using insights from “incomplete contract” theory.88  This 
theory posits that contracts, including trade agreements, are 
incomplete in their capacity to specify in detail how norms will be 
applied to future conduct.89  Focusing on the distinction between 
rules (specific norms) and standards (norms of broad meaning and 
application), Trachtman proposes that the WTO agreements are 
“optimally incomplete,” as they include not only rules, but also 
standards that give the DSB “appropriate instructions . . . to complete 
the ‘contract’ in particular cases.”90  By interpreting these standards 
in concrete cases, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism acts in the 
manner envisaged by the WTO agreements.  Despite the 
insightfulness of characterizing trade agreements as endogenously 
incomplete contracts, Trachtman’s positivist approach does not 
provide a comprehensive examination of how the DSB has actualized 
these standards.91  Trachtman’s anecdotal study does not address 
whether DSB completion of the “WTO contract” might have 
consistently favored one particular set of litigants.   
                                                                                                                      
 85. The authors conduct both a logit and an OLS regression to test their 
hypotheses. Id. at 329–30. Logit regression results indicated that none of the variables 
have a statistically significant effect on the Complainant Success Rate. Id. at 330. 
However, when using the OLS model, the regressors “Difference in Previous Use” and 
“Difference in Third Party Numbers” become statistically significant. Id. at 331. 
However, the empirical literature does not condone the use of OLS regression analysis 
where dichotomous dependent variables are present because the general assumptions 
of OLS regression are violated.  See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 594 
(4th ed. 2003).  
 86. See Maton & Maton, supra note 77, at 334. 
 87. Trachtman, supra note 13, at 333–34. 
 88. Id. at 334. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 346. 
 91. Trachtman’s study examines only two instances in which the Appellate 
Body “completed the contract”: Appellate Body Report, United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) 
[hereinafter US—Shrimp/Turtle], and Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting 
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998). Trachtman, 
supra note 13, at 334–35. 
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 None of these studies attempts to develop an overarching theory 
regarding the determinants of the higher rate of Complainant success 
in WTO litigation.  This Article expands on the existing literature in 
two key ways.  First, it takes advantage of a more detailed data set to 
analyze the outcomes of all WTO cases through September 2007 to 
determine if any discernable pattern in these outcomes can explain 
the high Complainant Success Rate.  In doing so, it examines several 
litigation-based variables, including type of litigant, level of 
development, and subject matter of the litigation.  It then subjects 
these variables to statistical testing.  Only with such statistical 
verification is it possible to discern whether the WTO dispute 
settlement system in fact favors a specific type of party or interest.  
Second, this Article adds a new perspective to the debate on why the 
WTO dispute settlement system functions as it does by proposing 
biased rule development as the explanation for the asymmetric 
nature of WTO dispute outcomes. 
IV.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
A.  Data and Methods 
1. Defining a Case 
 For purposes of this Article, a “case” is a dispute in which a WTO 
member has requested that a panel be established by the DSB 
pursuant to the provisions of the DSU.92  This, however, is not the 
first opportunity for potential litigants to avail themselves of their 
rights as WTO members.  When a member believes that a benefit 
accruing to it under any of the GATT/WTO agreements has been 
nullified or impaired by a measure taken by another member,93 it 
may request consultations with the “infringing” member.94  These 
consultations are similar to the informal negotiating process that 
ordinarily occurs when two parties meet before one decides to file a 
complaint with a domestic court.  Studies of patterns in domestic 
adjudication do not consider settlement activity that takes place 
before the filing of a complaint, as obtaining data on such activity is 
                                                                                                                      
 92. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 6.  
 93. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1)(a). A member may also claim that 
another member’s measure effectively deprives it of a benefit accruing under the 
agreements, even though the measure does not violate a specific provision of the WTO 
agreements.  Id. art. XXIII(1)(b). 
 94. DSU, supra note 7, art. 4; GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1). A complaining 
party must notify the DSB in writing when it requests consultations with another 
member to settle a matter before requesting a panel. DSU, supra note 7, art. 4(4). 
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not feasible.95  To render WTO adjudication comparable to domestic 
litigation, one must use consistent concepts.  Therefore, instead of 
looking at requests for consultations as the formal commencement of 
WTO adjudication, this study considers the panel request as the 
functional equivalent to filing a complaint in the domestic system.96   
 Indeed, as in a domestic system, it is only upon a member’s 
request to establish a panel that the DSB can exercise its “judicial” 
jurisdiction, or, in WTO parlance, its “terms of reference.”97  Prior 
consultations, on the other hand, are merely a pre-litigation 
requirement designed to encourage cooperation among potential 
litigants.  They operate much like notice-of-claim requirements in 
ordinary litigation, since they do not require any supervisory act by 
the adjudicating court.98  Moreover, panel requests, unlike requests 
for consultations, share a number of characteristics with domestic 
complaints: they are “made in writing”;99 they identify the offending 
conduct or omission (i.e., the “measure”);100 and they provide “a 
                                                                                                                      
 95. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet 
Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 755–56 (1992). A general 
criticism applicable to empirical scholarship on litigation is that it focuses on too 
restrictive a set of disputes—those that are actually filed—to reach conclusions about 
the general nature of litigation. While the inability to study litigants whom one never 
sees can limit one’s ability to fully model all litigation-related activity, it does not 
constitute an insurmountable barrier to understanding WTO adjudication. Studies of 
other litigation contexts reveal that “the linkage between developments among legal 
stages” of litigation “extend[s] back to the pre-filing settlement stage.” Id. at 757 (citing 
other studies). As potential WTO complainants recognize that Complainants 
traditionally have fared very well in the bulk of observed disputes, it is more than 
plausible that they have become more and more confident and filed more requests for 
panels. Also, in litigation settings where plaintiffs are not likely to get any meaningful 
relief unless they sue, the existence of “might have been” plaintiffs is inconsequential. 
For the many reasons discussed in Part V, WTO Respondents might be reluctant to 
offer settlement concessions. This minimizes WTO Complainants’ chances to obtain 
meaningful relief via pre-adjudication settlement, thereby forcing them to request the 
formation of a panel. Thus, the number of “might have been” WTO Complainants who 
refrain from suing after obtaining full redress of their grievances at the pre-panel 
request stage is likely quite limited.   
 96. For a discussion on the comparability of the WTO dispute settlement 
system to domestic court systems, see Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A 
Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 225 (2008) (“Among international 
tribunals, the WTO’s [Appellate Body] is arguably the most like domestic courts.”). 
 97. DSU, supra note 7, art. 7. 
 98. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (rejecting application of 
a state statute-mandated notice-of-claim requirement in federal civil rights litigation); 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) 
(“[Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), part of the Clean Water Act], the purpose of [pre-
litigation] notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into 
complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen 
suit.”).   
 99. Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (civil action 
commences with the filing of a complaint). 
 100. Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (short 
and plain statement of the claim). 
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summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the 
problem clearly.”101  Finally, analysis of the GATT and DSU texts 
supports the distinction drawn here between requests for 
consultations and panel requests.102  In sum, members’ requests for 
the establishment of panels are the WTO counterpart to domestic 
complaint filings, which constitute the unit of analysis of studies 
conducted under the traditional positive theory of litigation. 
2. Determining Case Outcomes 
 A case is considered to have a final outcome when the DSB 
adopts a panel or Appellate Body report.  A “settled” case is any case 
in which: (1) the complaining party withdraws the panel request; 
(2) the DSB defers the establishment of a panel103 (usually due to a 
responding party’s request) and the complaining party has not 
renewed its original request in the past three years;104 (3) the DSB 
establishes a panel105 but there has been no reported activity in the 
past three years; (4) the parties request that a panel stop its work106 
and the panel has remained inactive for twelve months; or (5) the 
parties officially notify the DSB that they have reached an agreed 
solution.107  Finally, a case is considered “active” when a panel 
request has been made and the panel or Appellate Body is currently 
working toward a formal disposition of the case.  The following table 
contains a breakdown of all WTO cases from January 1995 through 
September 2007:  
                                                                                                                      
 101. Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (short 
and plain statement of the claim). 
 102. See GATT, supra note 7, arts. XXII, XXIII (distinguishing between 
consultations and requests for panels after no satisfactory adjustment is reached); see 
also DSU, supra note 7, arts. 1, 3(5) (listing separately consultations and invocation of 
the dispute resolution process), 4(7) (discussing the procedure to be followed during 
consultations), 6 (discussing the process for requesting panel and requiring 
Complainants to state that consultations have been held). 
 103. DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(1). 
 104. In this study, this means any case that has remained inactive since 
September 2004. 
 105. DSU, supra note 7, art. 6. 
 106. Id. art. 12(12). 
 107. Id. art. 3(6). 
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TABLE A: STATUS OF CASES 
Case Status Number of Cases 
DSB Adopted Report 105 
Settled 44 
Active 29 
Total 178 
 
 Litigants’ success rates are calculated from the universe of 
adopted decisions.  A Complainant wins a case any time the 
Respondent’s measure is deemed not in compliance with the 
Respondent’s WTO obligations.  Conversely, a finding that at least 
one of Respondent’s measures “impairs or nullifies” Complainant’s 
cognizable rights under the “covered agreements” was coded as a 
Respondent loss, because at that point the Respondent is ordinarily 
under an obligation to bring the defeated measure into compliance.108   
 After determining the overall success rate of Complainants and 
Respondents (the dependent variable), the study attempted to 
ascertain whether litigants’ success rates correlate with a host of 
potential explanatory factors.  Factors tested included type of 
agreement invoked (e.g., trade remedy vs. non-trade remedy 
agreement), litigant identity (e.g., U.S., EC, Brazil, India, etc.), level 
of litigant’s development (e.g., First World vs. Third World), existence 
and type of litigant coalitions (e.g., Complainants from multiple 
countries), and type of product involved (e.g., commodities vs. 
noncommodities).  Should Complainant Success Rates remain 
unchanged regardless of the independent factor tested, then one can 
safely conclude that no particular case or litigant variables can 
account for litigant success.  Thus, absent asymmetric information or 
stake asymmetries (or both) among Complainants and Respondents, 
the detection of a sustained pattern of success by Complainants 
would indicate that the results might instead be caused by some 
inherent property of the WTO dispute settlement system.   
                                                                                                                      
 108. Another study, focusing on the 1995 to 2000 period, reported that 
Complainants succeeded in obtaining full or partial victories (“concessions”) in 79% of 
all disputes. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. 
WORLD TRADE 719, 725 (2003). 
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B.  Results 
 As discussed in Part III, prior studies have detected some 
general trends in WTO adjudication, with the high Complainant 
Success Rate being the most significant.  However, none of these 
studies examined whether such rates vary in response to the subject 
matter of a case, the identity of litigants, or change due to some other 
litigation-related factor.  A party’s overall high success rate cannot 
alone explain what other factors might be influencing litigation 
results.  This Part presents Complainant win rates along several 
different categories of cases and litigants and empirically tests 
whether variations within these categories have any statistical 
impact on such rates.  To avoid double-counting, only the outcomes 
from panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB are 
used.109   
 Table B.1 indicates that Complainant Success Rates vary 
between 83% and 91% across all Case Types.110  To test whether Case 
Type is statistically correlated with Complainant Success, I 
performed Fisher’s Exact Tests on cross-tabulations of these two 
variables and found no significant correlation.111  Furthermore, 
nothing in the Appellate Body’s decisions reveals that it distinguishes 
between trade remedy and non-trade remedy cases.   
 That the Complainant Success Rate appears unaffected by 
differences in Case Types is remarkable for at least two reasons.  
First, one would expect that in trade remedy cases—of which 
approximately half (twenty-two) are challenges to (Respondent) 
agencies’ antidumping rulings—Complainants would have a lower 
rate of success than in non-trade remedy cases.  Under the AD 
Agreement, agencies’ factual and legal determinations are owed a 
heightened, Chevron-like level of deference.112  Presumably, this 
should result in fewer Complainant wins in AD cases and, thus, 
                                                                                                                      
 109. The DSB does not consider panel reports for adoption when “a party to the 
dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal.”  DSU, supra note 7, art. 
16(4). However, panel analyses comprise a significant portion of DSB adoptions, as the 
Appellate Body has affirmed 91% of all panel decisions 
 110. Cases involving challenges to both trade remedies and non-trade remedies 
were excluded to avoid double-counting. Similarly, simultaneous challenges under the 
AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement were excluded. However, the excluded 
AD/SCM mixed cases were counted in the general trade remedy category. This 
counting methodology was applied to overlapping categories reported in the tables 
below. 
 111. The statistical results discussed in Part B (Fisher’s Exact Tests, two-tailed) 
were obtained from cross-tabulations of the independent variables displayed in the left 
columns of the tables below and Complainant Success Rate, the sole dependent 
variable studied. 
 112. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 17.6 (stating that a 
measure will be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon a permissible 
interpretation of law). 
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produce a lower Complainant Success Rate in trade remedy cases 
than in non-trade remedy cases.  Quite simply, outcome expectations 
based on the AD Agreement’s more Respondent-friendly standard did 
not result in a lower rate of Complainant wins in this category of 
cases.  Second, among trade remedy cases, one would expect 
challenges to AD decisions to result in a lower percentage of 
Complainant wins than in subsidy cases (i.e., cases under the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement) since the 
AD Agreement expressly prescribes a stringent standard of review 
while the SCM Agreement does not.113  Yet, the Complainant Success 
Rate in SCM cases (86%) was actually lower than in AD cases (91%), 
although the difference is not statistically significant.  That the AD 
Agreement’s prescribed level of deference has not resulted in lower 
Complainant Success Rates in statistical—or even in relative 
percentage—terms is both surprising and revealing.  This evidence 
seems to support Tarullo’s comment that the Appellate Body has 
disregarded the heightened AD standard of review.114   
TABLE B.1:  COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY CASE TYPE 
Case Type Complainant Success Rate 
Trade Remedy  88.89% 
     AD 90.91% 
     SCM 86.36% 
Non-Trade Remedy 83.33% 
Note:  Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between categories 
(rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically significant 
results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)). 
 Because case-specific distinctions cannot explain litigant success, 
one turns to Party Identity as a potential explanatory variable.  Of 
the 105 adopted DSB reports, the U.S. and the EC have been the two 
                                                                                                                      
 113. The question of which standard of review applies in SCM cases was hotly 
contested and (apparently) ultimately settled by the Appellate Body in United States—
Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) 
[hereinafter US—Leaded Bar]. In that case, when presented with a Ministerial 
Declaration recognizing the need to apply a common standard of review to both AD and 
SCM cases, the Appellate Body refused to apply the AD Agreement’s standard of 
review in the SCM context. According to the Appellate Body, the Declaration was 
merely hortatory. Cf. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 122, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) 
[hereinafter US—Shrimp/Turtle Compliance] (emphasis added) (recognizing that 
declarations can be binding on WTO members). These two cases are discussed in detail 
in Part VI.B below. 
 114. Tarullo, supra note 37, at 118. 
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most frequent Complainants, with 29 and 25 appearances 
respectively (51% of all cases).  If litigant success is related to Party 
Identity, cases involving the two most litigious WTO members might 
serve as a test for such a relationship.  As First World countries with 
presumably more resources dedicated to prosecuting WTO cases, the 
U.S. and the EC should have higher Complainant Success Rates.115  
Indeed, as Table B.2 illustrates, U.S. and EC success rates as 
Complainants are quite high—83% for the U.S. and 96% for the EC in 
all cases, regardless of subject matter.  However, cross-tabulations of 
Party Identity against Complainant Success Rate show that Party 
Identity is not a statistically significant factor, either in the aggregate 
or within any particular case category.  Similarly, an examination of 
cases where the U.S. and the EC appear as sole Complainants reveals 
that their lone appearance is not statistically correlated with their 
respective success rates.  Finally, as in Table B.1 (all countries), the 
percentage of U.S. and EC wins is systematically higher in trade 
remedy cases than otherwise, although this difference is not 
statistically significant.   
TABLE B.2:  COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY PARTY IDENTITY  
(U.S. & EC) 
Party Identity Complainant Success Rate 
U.S.  82.76% 
     Trade Remedy (5)116 100.00% 
          AD (1) 100.00% 
          SCM (3) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 79.17% 
   
                                                                                                                      
 115. For purposes of this study, a First World country is a “high income 
economy” according the World Bank Country Classification by income. Conversely, for 
purposes of this study, a Third World country is any country classified otherwise. See 
World Bank Country Classification, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~
piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (describing the 
World Bank’s classification of countries and providing a table showing each country’s 
current classification). 
 116. Of the five trade remedy cases the U.S. brought, Mexico—Rice was 
discarded from the pure AD and SCM count because it is both an AD and an SCM case. 
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, 
WT/DS295/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2005). Such mixed cases were similarly discarded 
throughout Part B. They were, however, included in the overall trade remedy count. 
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Party Identity Complainant Success Rate 
U.S. Alone 75.00% 
     Trade Remedy (3) 100.00% 
          AD (1) 100.00% 
          SCM (1) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 70.59% 
   
EC 96.00% 
     Trade Remedy 100.00% 
          AD (3) 100.00% 
          SCM (5) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 90.91% 
   
EC Alone 94.74% 
     Trade Remedy 100.00% 
          AD (3) 100.00% 
          SCM (4) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 88.89% 
Notes:  Where a category has five or fewer cases, the number of cases is indicated in 
parentheses.  Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between 
categories (rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically 
significant results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).   
 While Party Identity cannot account for the high Complainant 
Success Rate of the most litigious First World WTO members, one 
may still wonder if it might explain the Complainant Success Rates of 
the two most litigious Third World WTO members: Brazil (11 cases) 
and India (8 cases).  Table B.3 indicates that Brazil and India have 
very high rates of success as Complainants.  Overall, Brazil has won 
all of its cases and India has succeeded in all but one case it has 
brought so far (an 88% win rate).  As with the U.S. and the EC, cross-
tabulations of Party Identity against Complainant Success Rate 
showed that identity has no statistically significant correlation with a 
party’s win rate, either in the aggregate or within any particular Case 
Type.  Similarly, appearances by Brazil (100% win rate) and India 
(83% win rate) as sole Complainants were not statistically correlated 
with their success as complainants.  In keeping with the trend 
observed in Tables B.1 (all countries) and B.2 (U.S. and EC), the 
percentage of Brazilian and Indian wins is systematically higher in 
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trade remedy cases than otherwise, but, again, this difference is not 
statistically significant.   
TABLE B.3:  COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY PARTY IDENTITY  
(BRAZIL & INDIA) 
Party Identity Complainant Success Rate 
Brazil 100.00% 
     Trade Remedy 100.00% 
          AD (2) 100.00% 
          SCM (4) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy (3) 100.00% 
  
Brazil Alone 100.00% 
     Trade Remedy (5) 100.00% 
          AD (2) 100.00% 
          SCM (3) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy (1) 100.00% 
  
India 87.50% 
     Trade Remedy (3) 100.00% 
          AD (1) 100.00% 
          SCM (0) --- 
     Non-Trade Remedy 80.00% 
  
India Alone 83.33% 
     Trade Remedy (2) 100.00% 
          AD (1) 100.00% 
          SCM (0) --- 
     Non-Trade Remedy (4) 75.00% 
Notes:  Where a category has five or fewer cases, the number of cases is indicated in 
parentheses.  Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between 
categories (rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically 
significant results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)). 
 Arguably, a finding of no causation between Party Identity and 
Complainant success based on data that includes all litigants, or on a 
sample of the two most litigious First and Third World WTO 
2009] A THEORY OF WTO ADJUDICATION  407 
members, cannot by itself eliminate the possibility that Complainant 
win rates might be related to some other country-based explanation.  
One might posit, for instance, that a country’s success as a 
Complainant might be related to its level of income, even if this 
relationship could not be detected among the two most litigious 
members of each group tested above.  Indeed, working with larger 
samples by switching from dual-country to multiple-country analysis 
increases the chances of finding statistically significant relationships.  
Among the 105 adopted reports, First World countries initiated 
anywhere between 56% (59 cases brought solely by First World 
countries) and 70% of the empanelled WTO disputes (73 cases, 
including those brought with Third World countries as co-plaintiffs), 
while Third World countries were Complainants between 28% (29 
cases brought exclusively by Third World countries) and 35% (37 
cases, including those brought with First World countries as co-
plaintiffs) of the time.   
 As in prior tests, I looked at whether the dependent variable 
Complainant Success Rate changed as Income Level varied.  Table 
B.4 shows that Complainant Success Rates did vary between 84% (for 
all cases involving First World Complainants) and 92% (all cases 
involving Third World Complainants).  First World-Complainant-only 
cases showed an 80% win rate, while cases prosecuted solely by Third 
World Complainants showed a win rate of 90%.  These results 
conform to the overall pattern of high Complainant success in WTO 
litigation and appear to contradict the assumption that First World 
Complainants would fare better in WTO litigation.  However, these 
results provide no evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between a member’s Income Level and its likelihood of success as a 
Complainant.  Fisher’s Exact Tests on cross-tabulations between 
these two variables produced no statistical correlation, either by 
combining all cases together or by segregating them by subject 
matter.   
 I also detected another familiar trend: despite the lack of 
statistical significance, the percentage of First and Third World 
Complainant wins is systematically higher in trade remedy cases 
than in non-trade remedy cases.117  This pattern is puzzling given the 
differences in the text, declarations, and Appellate Body-approved 
                                                                                                                      
 117. The only exception is the Third World “all cases” sample. However, even 
this exception deserves some qualification. As in all other instances, the rate of 
Complainant success in AD cases is still relatively higher than or the same as the 
success rate in SCM cases, though the difference is not statistically significant. As 
discussed above, one would expect that the AD Agreement’s more agency-deferential 
standard of review would translate into more agency or Respondent wins (i.e., more 
Complainant losses) than in SCM cases, since the Appellate Body determined that the 
AD standard does not apply to cases under the SCM Agreement. See supra note 116 
and accompanying text. 
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interpretations of the WTO agreements.  With AD challenges 
constituting about half of all trade remedy disputes, one would expect 
the more Respondent-deferential AD standard of review to depress 
the Complainant Success Rate in the trade remedy category.  Even if 
one believed that WTO dispute resolution was created to favor 
Complainants, such belief would not be antithetical to the expectation 
that, at least in AD cases, a stricter standard of review should have 
some discernible impact on the results of WTO adjudication.   
TABLE B.4:  COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY INCOME LEVEL 
Income Level Complainant Success Rate 
First World 83.56% 
     Trade Remedy 88.24% 
          AD 90.00% 
          SCM 86.67% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 80.56% 
   
First World Alone 79.66% 
     Trade Remedy 85.71% 
          AD 90.00% 
          SCM 83.33% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 75.86% 
   
Third World 91.89% 
     Trade Remedy 91.30% 
          AD 91.67% 
          SCM 87.50% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 92.86% 
   
Third World Alone 89.66% 
     Trade Remedy 90.00% 
          AD 91.67% 
          SCM 85.71% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 88.89% 
Note:  Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between categories 
(rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically significant 
results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).   
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 Because Case Type, Party Identity, and Income Level cannot 
account for the high rate of Complainant success in WTO litigation, 
one must look beyond the impact of substantive variables to the 
potential role that interactions among members may have on 
adjudication.  Specifically, one would expect that joint appearances as 
Complainants would lead to more wins than solo appearances.  
Presumably, countries acting together increase their chances of 
success, not only by drawing more attention to the legal issues 
implicated in a case, but also by exerting greater pressure on the 
adjudicators to base their decisions along more majoritarian lines.  
Furthermore, co-Complainants can pool their resources and consult 
with one another throughout the process.  Indeed, in no other 
configuration were Complainants more successful than in the sixteen 
cases in which at least two of them appeared together.   
 Table B.5 shows that multiple Complainants have a perfect 
record as WTO litigants, both in the aggregate and by Case Type.  
Similarly, different combinations of First and Third World countries 
produced the same level of success.  At first, it appeared that in a 
system in which complainants have been very successful, this pooling 
effect might compound their chances of prevailing in litigation.  To 
detect whether multiple-Complainant appearances were statistically 
correlated with Complainant success, I performed Fisher’s Exact 
Tests on several cross-tabulations, but again found no statistically 
significant correlation, either in the aggregate or within any 
particular Case Type.   
TABLE B.5:  EFFECT OF MULTIPLE COMPLAINANTS ON  
COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE 
Multiple Complainant 
Appearances 
Complainant Success 
Rate 
All Cases 100.00% 
     Trade Remedy 100.00% 
          AD (0) --- 
          SCM (3) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy 100.00% 
   
U.S. & EC (3) 100.00% 
     Trade Remedy (1) 100.00% 
          AD (0) --- 
          SCM (1) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy (2) 100.00% 
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Multiple Complainant 
Appearances 
Complainant Success 
Rate 
Brazil & India (1) 100.00% 
     Trade Remedy (1) 100.00% 
          AD (0) --- 
          SCM (0) --- 
     Non-Trade Remedy (0) --- 
   
First World & Third World (5) 100.00% 
     Trade Remedy (3) 100.00% 
          AD (0) --- 
          SCM (1) 100.00% 
     Non-Trade Remedy (2) 100.00% 
Notes:  Where a category has five or fewer cases, the number of cases is indicated in 
parentheses.  Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between 
categories (rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically 
significant results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).   
 Having discarded Complainant interaction and other variables 
as explanations for Complainant success, I tested whether the 
Product Type implicated in a particular challenged measure could 
affect Complainants’ win rate.  Because commodities are a traditional 
export from mature industries in both First and Third World 
countries, they are typical candidates for trade-restricting measures 
on the part of importing countries (i.e., Respondents).118  Indeed, as 
scarcely differentiated goods, commodities are often in direct 
competition with nationally-sourced goods and are likely targets of 
protectionist measures; therefore, they are regularly involved in WTO 
disputes.119  Once challenged at the WTO, the logic goes, these 
commodity-restricting measures are more likely to be defeated than 
measures in noncommodity cases.  This is so because commodity-
restricting measures could be the product of collective action by rent-
                                                                                                                      
 118. For coding purposes, I relied on the MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics’ 
definition of “commodity” to distinguish between commodities and noncommodities. 
Specifically, a merchandise qualifies as a commodity if it is a “raw foodstuff or 
material” and is “widely traded internationally in organised markets.” THE MIT 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 68 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).    
 119. Note that despite the low degree of differentiation among commodities, 
developed countries often export and import the “same” commodities to each other 
because commodities, though often similar, are not necessarily identical. Research on 
intra-industry trade in the international economics subdiscipline has long recognized 
this feature of developed-country trade. See, e.g., HERBERT G. GRUBEL & P.J. LLOYD, 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE: THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 14 (1975). 
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seeking, less-dynamic domestic producers, which might not have the 
requisite political clout to preserve their domestic successes against 
the background of the higher, multisector considerations involved in 
WTO sovereign adjudication.120  If these assumptions are correct, one 
would expect WTO challenges to measures restricting commodity 
trade to have a high percentage of Complainant wins, with WTO 
dispute settlement functioning as the ultimate check on such 
protectionism.  Should this occur, and should Product Type turn out 
to be statistically correlated with Complainant Success Rate, the 
reason for such high win rates would be explained.   
 As Table B.6 illustrates, commodity cases do indeed have a high 
rate of Complainant success (90% of 48 cases), but so do 
noncommodity cases (82% of 57 cases).  It is no surprise then that 
cross-tabulations of Product Type against Complainant Success Rate 
show no statistically significant correlation between the two 
variables.  As in every test conducted in this study, the high 
Complainant Success Rate simply cannot be explained by any case or 
litigant-intrinsic characteristic.   
TABLE B.6:  EFFECT OF PRODUCT TYPE ON COMPLAINANT  
SUCCESS RATE 
Product Type Complainant Success Rate 
Commodity 89.58% 
Noncommodity 82.46% 
Note:  Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between categories 
(rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically significant 
results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).   
 Since none of the tested variables can account for WTO 
Complainants’ high success rates, one must wonder whether some all-
encompassing, systemic factor might be at work.  Indeed, these rates 
occur regardless of case or litigant characteristics.  The remainder of 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Prior empirical research in the context of U.S. judicial and NAFTA Chapter 
19 trade remedy litigation reveals that domestic commodity producer rent-seeking 
behavior cannot explain their high rate of success at the agency level. See Juscelino F. 
Colares, An Empirical Examination of Product and Litigant-Specific Theories for the 
Divergence Between NAFTA Chapter 19 and U.S. Judicial Review, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 
691, 709 (2008) (“[M]any investigations of commodities, like Softwood Lumber, Pork 
and Wheat, involve at least as concentrated downstream U.S. consuming industries as 
they involve U.S. producers seeking trade barriers.”). Because members of large or 
more concentrated commodity importing industries and their foreign industry allies 
can be just as well organized for collective action as the domestic producing industry, 
they often are well positioned to offset domestic producers’ rent-seeking attempts at 
winning domestic-agency protection. 
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this article discusses some potential explanations of the systemic 
prevalence of high Complainant Success Rates.   
V.  ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
A.  Case Selection Effect and the Results of WTO Dispute Settlement 
 One could argue that a case selection effect undermines any 
conclusion regarding the general nature of WTO dispute 
settlement.121  Since the sustained pattern of Complainant success is 
based on observing only fully adjudicated disputes, the high 
percentage of Complainant wins describes at most the characteristics 
of fully adjudicated disputes, rather than the characteristics of the 
entire universe of disputes brought before the DSB system.122  
However, the case selection effect fails as an alternative explanation 
in the WTO context for two basic reasons.   
 First, case selection as a result of settlement agreements has 
little effect on the DSB system, where approximately 70% of all cases 
in which a panel is requested are fully adjudicated without settlement 
(105 of 149 cases).123  These statistics are in stark contrast to 
patterns observed in U.S. civil litigation, where only 1.8%124 of 
federal civil cases125 are fully adjudicated and up to 72% of the 
disputes are terminated due to settlements.126  The low frequency of 
WTO settlement activity undercuts the selection argument, as the 
                                                                                                                      
 121. See Priest & Klein, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing that doctrinal information 
has disclosed little about how legal rules affect behavior or affect the generation of 
legal disputes). 
 122. For reasons discussed in Part IV.A.1 supra, the reader should recall that 
the formal commencement of WTO litigation for purposes of this study is triggered by 
the request for a panel. Therefore, cases dropped before a request for a panel is made 
are not part of the population of disputes investigated in this study. 
 123. See supra tbl. A. 
 124. Percentage from 2002. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004). 
 125. Note that even in the realm of litigation that often involves high monetary 
stakes and litigants with substantial resources, such as intellectual property cases, the 
rate of trials as a percentage of dispositions is very low (2.4% in the U.S.). See id. at 
463; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 PATENT AND TRADEMARK DAMAGES STUDY 
(2007), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/3ca24a75615f0394802 
5711e004b69a0/$file/2007_Patent_Study.pdf (reporting that the median award amount 
for 2005 was $6,000,000). The much lower settlement-to-total-number-of-disputes ratio 
in WTO litigation makes WTO outcomes much more representative of overall 
litigation. 
 126. See Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial 
Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil 
Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 729–33 (2004) (using data from 2000, 
including consent judgments, but not cases disposed of through abandonment or 
default). 
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subset of fully adjudicated disputes represents such a large portion of 
the entire universe of disputes.  More importantly, Complainants are 
winning more cases, not fewer, even after one excludes their 
presumably stronger, settled cases. 
 Second, even assuming the presence of a selection effect in the 
70% of disputes reaching full adjudication, this effect cannot account 
for the magnitude of the win rate disparity between Complainants 
and Respondents.  Complainant Success Rates ranging from 83% to 
91% across all Case Types are a substantial deviation from the 50% 
success rate expected under random litigation assumptions.127  Thus, 
even if a residual selection effect exists here—because cases decided 
do not comprise 100% of all empanelled cases—such a large deviation 
in litigant success rates is too substantial and systematic to be 
attributed to case selection alone.   
B.  Effect of Settlement Constraints on WTO Adjudication 
 The relative low frequency of settlement activity in WTO 
adjudication in comparison to ordinary adjudication merits 
consideration beyond the case selection context.  The presence and 
potential importance of settlement constraints in WTO adjudication 
could be a systemic explanation for WTO dispute outcomes.  
Specifically, a low level of settlement activity in WTO litigation (only 
about 30% of all litigation) might be the reason for such high 
Complainant Success Rates.  If, due to some feature of the WTO 
system’s design, members face significant settlement constraints, the 
occurrence of high Complainant success might be attributed to 
Respondents’ inability to settle.   
 A previous study suggests that informal constraints, such as 
members’ inability to make deals involving transfers in unrelated 
areas or members’ general reluctance to procure settlement via cash 
payments, reduce the scope and the possibility of settlement in WTO 
litigation.128  It also proposes that the operation of the MFN principle 
further limits members’ willingness to enter into settlements because 
they hesitate to offer concessions that “may have to be granted to 
                                                                                                                      
 127. The Author is aware of only one other adjudicatory system that has 
produced higher plaintiff success rates: the Japanese criminal justice system, where 
conviction rates exceed 99%. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the 
Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53–54 (2001). However, the 
authors of this study demonstrate these high conviction rates result from case selection 
and low prosecutorial budgets, as “understaffed prosecutors present judges with only 
the most obviously guilty defendants.” Id. at 53. This phenomenon does not appear to 
occur in WTO adjudication, where the “prosecutor” is necessarily a sovereign 
government who typically has more budgetary discretion than a prosecutor in criminal 
proceedings. 
 128. Guzman & Simmons, supra note 10, at 210–11. 
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every WTO member state.”129  One could thus hypothesize that the 
combined effect of these institutional characteristics has a depressing 
effect on the rate of settlements in WTO litigation.  At first glance, 
the low settlement rate verified in WTO adjudication seems to 
support this hypothesis.130   
 However, before one can conclude that settlement constraints are 
the driving forces behind the highly asymmetric pattern of 
Complainant and Respondent Success Rates, it must first be shown 
that these constraints indeed influence members’ litigation behavior.  
Taking the operation of the MFN principle and other settlement 
constraints into account, one would expect that a Respondent’s trade 
dependence affects its attitude toward settlement.  Specifically, 
Respondents with higher trade-to-GDP ratios should have lower 
settlement rates due to their heavier reliance on trade.  Such reliance 
on trade should cause Respondents to hesitate extending settlement 
offers, because whatever special concession they offer to 
Complainants must necessarily be granted to other WTO members, 
creating potential broad repercussions in their economies.131  
Conversely, if settlement constraints significantly influence 
Respondents’ litigation behavior, Respondents with lower trade 
dependence should be more inclined to settle, because any concession 
granted would have a comparatively smaller impact on their overall 
economy.   
 To determine whether Respondents’ litigation behavior is 
susceptible to settlement constraints, I obtained each Respondent’s 
trade-to-GDP ratio132 and then regressed this ratio against its 
settlement rate.133  The goal was to ascertain whether a Respondent’s 
trade dependence, as measured by its trade-to-GDP ratio, affected its 
attitude toward settlement as demonstrated by its settlement rate.  I 
also looked at Respondents’ import-to-GDP ratios as an alternative 
regressor.  Arguably, a country’s import level most directly reflects 
the effects of settlement concessions, as other trade partners are 
likely to take advantage of removed restrictions on trade.   
                                                                                                                      
 129. Id. at 210. 
 130. To be clear, Guzman & Simmons did not propose that settlement 
constraints provide a systemic explanation for WTO outcomes. See id. Rather, this 
author uses their observation regarding settlement constraints to test whether these 
constraints have a significant impact on the overall pattern of WTO outcomes. 
 131. Viewed in this way, the MFN principle operates in the settlement context 
much like res judicata does in the ordinary adjudication context. 
 132. Data on Respondents' overall merchandise trade (export + imports) and 
GDP was obtained from each member’s “Trade Profile” in the WTO Website. World 
Trade Organization, Trade Profiles, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountry 
PFReporter.aspx?Language=E (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). All figures were calculated 
in 2005 U.S. dollars. Id. 
 133. Respondents’ settlement rates were calculated as the ratio between number 
of cases settled and the total number of cases. 
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 Table C reports the results of these two linear regressions.  
These models show that the economic dimension of settlement 
constraints, as reflected in Respondents’ overall trade or import 
levels, is likely not affecting Respondents’ attitudes toward 
settlement.  None of these models or their regressors was statistically 
significant at the .05 probability level.  Furthermore, since one can be 
95% confident that the intervals around each regression coefficient 
contain the true regression slope, and because each interval includes 
a value of zero, Respondents’ concerns over the potential economic 
impact of concessions likely have had no impact on their settlement 
behavior.  
TABLE C:  REGRESSION MODELS OF SETTLEMENT RATE 
 N [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
t 
(p-value) 
Model’s F 
(p-value) 
R2/Adj-R2 
Regressors based 
on Respondents’ 
Trade Profile: 
 
     
    trade-to-GDP 
                 (tGDP)  
                   .109 
                  (.214) 
 
27 [-.332     .549] .510 
(.616) 
.260 
(.616) 
.010/-.029 
    import-to-GDP 
                  (iGDP) 
                    .106 
                  (.441) 
 
27 [-.802     1.015] .240 
(.812) 
.060 
(.812) 
.002/-.0376 
Notes:  Regressor coefficients and standard errors are presented below regressors.  
Models’ intercepts are not reported.  Regressor and model test statistics and their p-
values (in parentheses) are reported in separate columns.  Both models were estimated 
by using the “regress” command in Stata (v.9.2).   
 Because the potential economic effect of settlement concessions is 
not correlated with settlement rates, one must deduce that settlement 
constraints have not influenced Respondent settlement calculus.  
Thus, although potentially having a settlement-depressing influence, 
settlement constraints cannot alone account for the extreme 
imbalance between Complainant and Respondent success in 
litigation.  The magnitude of the outcome asymmetry is too great to 
be explained by an otherwise empirically minor feature of the system.  
Perhaps the existence of certain built-in incentives for full 
adjudication offers a better explanation for the low settlement rate 
than does a theory of settlement constraints.  The WTO litigation 
system and its associated expenses are largely a sunk cost.  “Court” 
costs are covered by members’ contributions, and most WTO legal 
representation is institutionally built into governmental budgets.  
Therefore, WTO members are not exposed to all of the financial 
constraints that confront ordinary litigants.  Yet, adjudication does 
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present an opportunity cost.  Trade diplomats are also busy 
conducting further rounds of negotiations and complying with their 
countries’ trade policy reporting requirements, when they are not 
already involved in other litigation.  In any case, WTO members’ 
reluctance to settle is likely the result of a much more complex 
calculus than the mere existence of settlement constraints 
suggests.134   
C.  Asymmetry of Information and Asymmetry of Stakes 
 It is possible that the relatively high frequency of pro-
Complainant outcomes in WTO litigation is simply the result of 
better-informed Complainants whose cases are also meritorious.  
Indeed, some non-trade studies have pointed to instances in ordinary 
litigation where better-informed plaintiffs systematically bring cases 
and litigate them more effectively than defendants.135  To date, 
however, there is no empirical support for this type of claim in the 
WTO context.  In fact, the finding that country identity, income level, 
and case subject matter play no part in WTO litigation undermines 
the case for any information advantage by Complainants alone.  
Thus, a thesis that Complainants, as the “haves” in WTO litigation, 
are the likely successful litigants, and Respondents, as the “have 
nots,” are the likely losers, has no empirical support.  Where 
Complainant Success Rates cannot be attributed to any particular 
plaintiff characteristic or Case Type, and where no evidence exists to 
support any information advantage by Complainants, it is highly 
unlikely that some undetected and systemic information asymmetry 
is causing these results.  Furthermore, there does not seem to be any 
theoretical support for this view.  As in ordinary litigation, WTO 
litigants face similar, albeit not necessarily identical, economic 
incentives.  Governments on each side are pressured by domestic 
interests who are more than willing to close any perceived 
information gaps in their government’s cases. Thus, these incentives 
typically keep governments “honest” and discourage weak 
representation.   
                                                                                                                      
 134. See infra Part V.D–E (discussing whether this calculus and Respondents’ 
inability to settle might be the result of a faulty assessment of the system in which 
they operate). 
 135. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff 
Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S109 (1997) 
(acknowledging that differing information available to plaintiffs and defendants may 
be a factor in trial outcomes); Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. 
LEGAL. STUD. 29, 29–30 (1995) (asserting that asymmetric information about the likely 
outcome at trial plays a large role in the decision to go to trial or settle); Keith N. 
Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. 
LEGAL. STUD. 187, 189 (1993) (suggesting that strategic behavior stemming from an 
informational advantage is necessary to explain litigation patterns). 
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 Under a different theory, one could argue that Complainants, as 
the initiators of litigation, are more invested in judicial disputes due 
to their condition as “aggrieved” parties.  This self-perception might 
provide Complainants with the impetus to invest more resources and 
effort in prosecuting their cases, thus producing stake asymmetry.  
However, the rationale applicable to information asymmetry applies 
equally here.  For instance, as the discussion of the role of the MFN 
principle in the settlement context illustrates, Respondents are fully 
aware of the res judicata implications of a settlement offer and are 
just as interested as Complainants in presenting a strong case.  
Moreover, even when facing a weak case on the merits, a strategically 
minded senior trade bureaucrat might find a well-fought WTO loss 
much more politically palatable than the offer of a meaningful 
settlement to a Complainant that might disappoint electoral 
interests.136  Thus, stake asymmetry cannot theoretically or 
empirically explain the discrepancy in Complainant and Respondent 
win rates.  Simply put, the highly asymmetric pattern of 
Complainant Success Rates requires an alternative, more robust, 
systemic explanation.   
D.  Complainant Desire to Make Law 
 One could also suggest that Complainants’ preference for “rule 
results” instead of “tangible results” explains the dearth in settlement 
activity in WTO adjudication and therefore the persistent high 
Complainant Success Rate.  Marc Galanter was among the first to 
analyze the outcomes of a case in terms of a rule component and a 
tangible component.  He proposed that a repeat litigant “interested in 
maximizing his tangible gain in a series of cases . . . may be willing to 
trade off tangible gain in any one case for rule gain (or to minimize 
                                                                                                                      
 136. Note that not all trade disputes are politically salient in terms of their 
electoral implications. While the electoral dimensions of a case may discourage 
settlement in some instances—e.g., US–Steel Safeguards—not all trade disputes have 
significant electoral import. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, 
WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, 
WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003) (affirming the 
Panel's finding that safeguard measures imposed by the United States “were deprived 
of a legal basis,” and suggesting that the U.S. bring its safeguard measures into 
conformity with its obligations under certain WTO agreement). That many WTO 
disputes are not inherently political, but rather the product of interest-group rent-
seeking activity, is illustrated by cases such as EC—Bananas III and Brazil—
Retreaded Tires, where litigants could have settled without necessarily incurring any 
tangible electoral loss. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tires, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). In sum, electoral politics does not influence settlement 
behavior in all cases.   
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rule loss).”137  By virtue of “experience and expertise,” Galanter 
argues, a repeat litigant is willing to decline an immediate, albeit 
fully satisfying settlement offer in favor of the opportunity to pursue 
the long-term advantage that continuing with litigation might 
bring.138  Because they expect to litigate again, such litigants are 
motivated to “play for precedent” and thus seek to obtain a favorable 
ruling that will have implications for future disputes.139  Since some 
“WTO plaintiffs” have been repeat litigants, one must wonder if their 
desire to make law has kept them away from settlements, which in 
turn would explain Respondents’ inability to reduce their overall 
losses by settling.   
 The notion that repeat Complainants have systematically 
refrained from settling, thus rejecting tangible outcomes in favor of 
proceeding with litigation aimed at creating precedent, lacks any 
empirical support.  Unlike the prototypical repeat litigants in 
Galanter’s study who tend to appear in one particular posture (i.e., as 
defendants), WTO repeat Respondents also often appear as 
Complainants.  Remarkably, the “experience and expertise” gained 
from being repeat litigants on one side fails to explain their very 
disparate success rates.  For example, the U.S. appeared as 
Complainant 29 times, with an 83% win rate, while it appeared as 
Respondent 38 times, with an 82% loss rate.  In the 25 instances in 
which the EC appeared as Complainant, it won 96% of the time, but 
lost in 88% of its 17 appearances as Respondent.  Aside from being 
nearly identical, these win–loss rates reveal that repeat litigants 
have not been able to successfully implement a “play-for-precedent” 
strategy, if they ever had one.140  Moreover, from a theoretical 
perspective, Galanter’s argument is based on a dichotomy between 
one-time and repeat litigants facing each other in litigation, with a 
definite advantage accruing to the latter group due to experience and 
expertise.  As discussed earlier, this argument is premised on the 
type of information and stake asymmetry that has not been detected 
in this or other studies of WTO litigation.   
 Yet, the notion that Complainants have gained expertise from 
engaging in litigation should not be discarded merely because they 
                                                                                                                      
 137. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 101 (1974). 
 138. Id. at 103. 
 139. For a discussion on the de facto precedential power of rulings in subsequent 
WTO adjudication, see Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in 
WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 151 (1999). 
 140. In the 38 cases where the U.S. appeared as a Respondent, the EC was a 
Complainant in 11 cases (29%). Conversely, in the 17 cases in which the EC was a 
Respondent, the U.S. was a Complainant 6 times (35%). Thus, even if these members’ 
respective Respondent losses were fully attributable to litigating with the other repeat 
litigant, these experts in WTO litigation should have still lost fewer cases as 
Respondents.   
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have been unable to replicate their success when appearing as 
Respondents.  In fact, they may have relied on such expertise to 
decide not to bring more cases, as they realize that every win reduces 
their discretion as sovereign states.  They understand that a trade 
liberalizing decision creates precedent that restrains the universe of 
policy and regulatory choices they may adopt in the future.  
Complainants realize that appearing before a court that is more than 
willing to restrain members’ ability to regulate trade may give rise to 
a “winner’s curse.”  In this sense, the asymmetric pattern of 
Complainant wins, although an auspicious omen, may actually abate 
their litigiousness.   
E.  Weakness of Respondents’ Cases 
 A final potential systemic explanation for high Complainant 
Success Rates could be that Respondents have consistently failed to 
present meritorious defenses.  However, the notion that Respondents 
have been consistently incorrect in their interpretation of WTO law 
fails for several reasons.  First, Respondents in one case often appear 
as Complainants in other cases with unmatched success.  That they 
can successfully adjudicate as Complainants demonstrates that they 
do understand and can apply the provisions covered by the same 
agreements on which they tend to make losing arguments as 
Respondents.  Second, according to the positive theory of litigation,141 
upon recognizing their early failures in WTO dispute settlement, 
Respondents should have adjusted their litigation strategies by, for 
example, settling more cases which would have improved their win 
rate.142  However, as Figure A illustrates, Respondent win rates show 
no signs of convergence with Complainant win rates.  In fact, the 
passage of time shows a growing divergence in litigants’ relative 
success.  After a brief early period (1996–1998)143 in which success 
rates converged, Respondent and Complainant win rates increasingly 
diverged with the passage of time.144   
                                                                                                                      
 141. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting that when gains or 
losses from litigation are equal to both parties, there is a strong bias toward a rate of 
success for plaintiffs at trial of 50% regardless of the substantive standard of law). 
 142. As demonstrated earlier, WTO litigants have only opted for settlements 
30% of the time. See supra Part IV.B. Moreover, as also demonstrated above, 
settlement constraints are not to blame for the low utilization of settlements. Rather, 
the low settlement rate must be attributed to WTO litigants’ choices. 
 143. Although there were five panel requests in 1995, the DSB would only have 
the opportunity to adopt reports in the following year since all panel decisions were 
appealed. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 16(4) (implying that a panel report is appealed 
before the DSB adoption).   
 144. Of the thirteen cases decided in 1998, Complainants won eight cases (62%) 
and Respondents won five (38%).  
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FIGURE A:  ADJUDICATION OUTCOMES BY YEAR OF DSB ADOPTION 
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 However, even the early approximation in Respondent and 
Complainant win rates appears to be more a result of how litigation 
outcomes are tabulated than evidence of an actual convergence in 
litigation outcomes.  Figure B reports litigants’ success rates for all 
cases based on the year in which the panel was requested.  For 
instance, among the five requests for a panel made in 1995, 
Complainants eventually won four cases (80%) and Respondents won 
only one (20%).  Viewed in this way, the early 1995–1998 convergence 
in litigant win rates was nothing more than one of three contrarian 
fluctuations in an overall increasingly divergent trend.   
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FIGURE B:  ADJUDICATION OUTCOMES BY YEAR OF PANEL REQUEST 
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 Yet, this lack of convergence in success rates conveys very little 
about the quality of Respondents’ cases.  It merely suggests the 
possibility that Respondents have been myopic in their estimates of 
success.  That some defect in WTO Respondents’ litigation calculus 
causes them to poorly forecast specific case outcomes does not imply 
that their defenses have no merit.   
 Alternatively, it is possible that Respondents have gone forward 
with litigation despite a strong likelihood of defeat, not because they 
fail to see inherent weaknesses in their cases, but rather because they 
strongly believe in the value of presenting their cases before a 
seemingly unbiased adjudicator.  The fact that the countries that are 
most frequently Respondents are also among the most frequent 
Complainants and are, therefore, very successful litigants, might 
distort their perception of how the system actually operates.145  In the 
                                                                                                                      
 145. As discussed in Part IV, the U.S. has appeared as Complainant in 28% and 
as Respondent in 36%, respectively, of all disputes. The EC has been the Respondent in 
24% and the Complainant in 16%, respectively, of all disputes. As Third World 
countries have done just as well as or even slightly better (in absolute terms) than their 
First World counterparts, their perceptions as Complainants have likely influenced 
their overall perception of the WTO dispute settlement system as well. Indeed, 
Respondents, as most individuals, “tend to overestimate the frequency of 
memorable . . . events” and they may persist in “incorrect judgments in the face of 
inconsistent new information.” Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 694 n.217 (1987) (citation 
omitted). 
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absence of presenting systematically weak cases, Respondents’ faith 
in the adjudicatory system, although contributing to their overall rate 
of losses, is not the ultimate cause of their high loss rate, but the 
unperceived bias of the adjudicatory system might be.  In any case, 
the fact that success rates show no significant correlation with 
Complainant or Respondent identity or case attributes suggests that 
a phenomenon other than case weakness or poorer lawyering is at 
work.  Thus, the possibility that Respondents’ faulty assessment of 
the system in which they participate has contributed to a greater loss 
rate does not negate the potential of biased rule development as a 
systemic explanation. 
VI.  BIASED RULE DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 
 The existence of a systematic, asymmetrical pattern of outcomes 
in WTO dispute settlement has so far defied any robust empirical 
explanation.  Typical litigation-based variables and other systemic 
explanations, such as case selection, settlement constraints, 
information and stake asymmetries, Complainants’ desire to make 
law, and the weakness of Respondents’ cases fail to account for the 
sustained high Complainant Success Rates in WTO adjudication.  It 
is only logical to ponder whether these systematic asymmetrical 
findings are the result of a process of authoritative normative 
evolution (i.e., rule development) that has expressed itself with a tilt 
favoring Complainants—hence the term “biased rule development.”   
 In general, adjudication is a mode of interaction that, at least in 
form, is largely egalitarian.  As in other adjudicatory contexts, WTO 
litigants are equal before the law and play by rules of engagement 
that “do not permit them to deploy all their resources in the conflict, 
but require that they proceed within the limiting forms” of WTO 
dispute settlement.146  In such disputes, the applicable law can be 
any one or several of the negotiated agreements dealing with diverse 
aspects of international trade.  Of course, one would not expect WTO 
rule development to be isolated from the influence of external 
intellectual currents or from “the preferences and prudences of the 
decision-makers.”147  Clearly, the agreements will be articulated by a 
set of individuals who are not operating in an intellectual vacuum.  
Still, specific and purposeful distinctions among the agreements, such 
as differing standards of review, should be reflected in the decisions 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Galanter, supra note 137, at 135; see also DSU, supra note 7, art.1; JOHN H. 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109 (2d ed. 1997) (contrasting settlement by 
negotiation and agreement with reference (explicitly or implicitly) to relative power 
status of the parties with settlement by negotiation or decision with reference to norms 
or rules both parties have previously agreed). 
 147. Galanter, supra note 137, at 103. 
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issued by the adjudicating authorities and in the overall pattern of 
outcomes.  To date, the uniform pattern of complainant success, 
regardless of the agreement underlying the dispute, indicates that 
WTO adjudication fails to map out these distinctions.  This 
distinction and WTO adjudicators’ adoption of other pro-Complainant 
decisional patterns are the most robust explanation for the 
asymmetric nature of WTO adjudication.   
A.  Biased Ruled Development in the Application of the  
AD Standard of Review 
 The high rate of Complainant success in one type of dispute 
under an agreement with a more Respondent-deferential standard of 
review—the AD Agreement—could result from Respondents’ 
systematically poor defenses on the merits.  In this manner, a more 
deferential standard of review cannot by itself produce the expected 
higher rate of Respondent success in the presence of the most 
egregious violations of an agreement.  However, there is no evidence 
that confirms the occurrence in AD disputes of systematically weaker 
defenses or more egregious violations than in disputes arising under 
other agreements.  On the contrary, a look at the early years of WTO 
dispute settlement (January 1995–September 2002), with a specific 
focus on WTO decisions in AD cases, actually reveals that the lower-
than-expected rate of Respondent success was less related to the 
relative strengths of the litigants’ cases than to the adjudicators’ 
dilution of the AD Agreement’s standard of review.  In light of the 
general consensus that WTO adjudicators view prior decisions as 
having at least some precedential value, I focused on early WTO 
decisions concerning AD cases.148  If this consensus is correct, these 
cases have significant future import and thus provide an ideal 
window into the nature of WTO dispute settlement.   
 There were a total of ten adjudications involving disputes under 
the AD Agreement during this period.149  The standard of review of 
                                                                                                                      
 148. See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 139, at 151 (observing de facto precedent on 
procedural and substantive issues). 
 149. Panel Report, Egypt—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar 
from Turkey, WT/DS211/R (Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Egypt—Steel Rebar]; Panel 
Report, United States—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate 
from India, WT/DS206/R (June 28, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States—
Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 
WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter US—Steel Products]; Appellate Body 
Report, Thailand—Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron of 
Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type 
Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001); Panel Report, United States—
Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and 
Strip from Korea, WT/DS179/R (Dec. 22, 2000); Panel Report, Guatemala—Definitive 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R (Oct. 24, 
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national authorities’ legal interpretations is expressly set forth within 
the Agreement:   
[T]he panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.  Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of 
the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the 
panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the 
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.150   
A similarly deferential standard applies to Respondents’ factual 
determinations.  Indeed, so long as Respondent authorities’ factual 
evaluations are “unbiased and objective,” the panel should not 
overturn them “even though the panel might have reached a different 
conclusion.”151  Despite its sui generis status as the only standard of 
review explicitly developed for a particular type of WTO dispute, and 
notwithstanding its heightened deference to Respondents’ 
authorities, the Article 17.6(ii) standard did not lead to any pro-
Respondent jurisprudence in the earlier years of WTO dispute 
settlement.  Respondents lost every single case.  In fact, as Tarullo 
observed, “It is difficult to identify any issue in any of the cases in 
which this special standard has produced an outcome different from 
that which would have prevailed had there been no Article 17.6.”152 
1. Nullification of the AD Standard by Capriciously Interpreting Its 
Terms 
 The Appellate Body most thoroughly articulated its views on the 
application of the Article 17.6(ii) standard in US–Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US–Steel 
Products).153  In the course of an AD investigation, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (Commerce), pursuant to its regulations,154 
rejected information from two Japanese companies because they had 
failed to submit such information within the required deadline (87 
                                                                                                                      
2000); Panel Report, Mexico—Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000); Panel Report, United 
States—Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) of One Megabit of Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999); Appellate 
Body Report, Guatemala—Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement 
from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Guatemala—Cement].   
 150. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 17(6)(ii). 
 151. Id. art. 17(6)(i). 
 152. Tarullo, supra note 37, at 118; accord MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 393 (2d ed. 2006) (“[W]e 
have yet to see a case in which the choice of a standard of review had an impact on the 
outcome of a dispute.”). 
 153. Tarullo, supra note 37, at 118. 
 154. See Customs Duties, 19 C.F.R. § 351.301 (2008). 
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days).155  In its WTO challenge, Japan argued that the U.S. agency 
could not reject this information solely because it was submitted after 
the agency’s established deadline.156  The panel found that Commerce 
had not acted in conformity with AD Article 6.8, which requires 
interested parties to “provide[] necessary information within a 
reasonable period” and allows the investigating authority to proceed 
with the investigation on a “facts available” basis.  The panel first 
explained that “a ‘reasonable period’ will not in all instances be 
commensurate with pre-established deadlines set out in general 
regulations.”157  Using this flexible definition, the panel concluded 
that Commerce’s refusal of a submission that “could have been 
verified and used, but was instead rejected as untimely,” was not 
consistent with Article 6.8, since “an unbiased and objective 
investigating authority evaluating that evidence could not have 
reached the conclusion that [the Japanese companies] had failed to 
provide necessary information within a reasonable period.”158   
 On appeal, the U.S. argued that Commerce’s pre-established 
deadlines for data submission were “reasonable” and constituted “a 
permissible interpretation” of Article 6.8.159  Using the language of 
Article 17.6(i), the U.S. maintained that “even if the panel might have 
reached a different conclusion,” that conclusion should not displace 
an objective and unbiased decision by the domestic agency to reject 
the evidence as submitted.160  Remarkably, the Appellate Body 
focused its analysis solely on the “objective and unbiased” portion of 
the Article 17.6(i) standard and never addressed the “permissible 
interpretation” argument put forth by the U.S.161  The Appellate 
Body held that the panel had been correct in ruling that Commerce 
had failed the “objective and unbiased” portion of the test by not 
concluding that the Japanese companies had provided the necessary 
information within a “reasonable period.”162  To determine what 
constitutes a reasonable period, the Appellate Body developed a list of 
six factors that antidumping authorities should consider as they 
analyze “the particular circumstances of each case.”163  Because 
Commerce failed to conduct a “reasonableness analysis” similar to 
that proposed by the Appellate Body, the Appellate Body found its 
                                                                                                                      
 155. See US—Steel Products, supra note 149, ¶ 10 (discussing the assertion of 
the United States that deadlines were reasonable). 
 156. Id. ¶ 18. 
 157. Panel Report, United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 7.54, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001).   
 158. Id. ¶¶ 7.55, 7.57. 
 159. US—Steel Products, supra note 149, ¶¶ 9–10. 
 160. Id. ¶ 11. 
 161. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. 
 162. Id. ¶¶ 87–90. 
 163. Id. ¶ 85. 
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action did “not rest upon a permissible interpretation of Article 6.8 of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”164   
 While a reference to the “permissible interpretation” language of 
Article 17.6(ii) might create the illusion that the Appellate Body was 
in fact applying the standard as it construed the term “reasonable,” 
the Appellate Body actually nullified it by creating a new, non-
contemporaneous test.  In basing its decision solely on its newly 
constructed reasonableness test, the Appellate Body failed to consider 
that Commerce’s interpretation might fall squarely within the 
ordinary meaning of the term.165  In any litigation system in the 
world, tardy submissions are per se impermissible.  Indeed, the 
conclusion that “an administrative agency may never ‘reasonably’ 
adhere strictly to the letter of limits it may establish for the 
submission of information by interested parties, even if those limits 
are themselves generous” is “inconsistent with much administrative 
and judicial practice.”166  In fact, paragraph 3 of Annex II of the 
Agreement—referenced by Article 6.8—incorporates the ordinary 
meaning of reasonableness by explicitly referring to “verifiable 
information” as information submitted “in a timely fashion.”167  More 
importantly, the AD Agreement itself adheres to the general 
presumption of reasonableness of national authorities’ regulations by 
directing WTO adjudicators to “examine the matter based upon . . . 
facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic 
procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.”168  That the 
Appellate Body could find a generally accepted practice unreasonable 
while extolling the flexibility of the very term “reasonableness” 
demonstrates its willingness to disregard the mandated standard and 
engage in sophistry.   
2. Application of a Non-Deferential Standard Where the AD 
Standard Controls 
 A more troubling aspect of the Appellate Body’s pro-Complainant 
interpretation of the AD Agreement, however, has been the 
systematic erosion of the Article 17.6(ii) deferential standard.  In non-
AD disputes, the Appellate Body has recognized that Article 17.6 
                                                                                                                      
 164. Id. ¶ 89 (italics in original). 
 165. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1),  May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).   
 166. Tarullo, supra note 37, at 124. 
 167. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, Annex II, ¶ 3 (“All information 
which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the 
investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion . . . 
should be taken into account when determinations are made.” (emphasis added)).   
 168. Id. art. 17.5(ii). 
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“sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that 
Agreement,”169 and acknowledged that no agreement but the Anti-
Dumping Agreement “prescrib[es] a particular standard of review.”170  
In fact, the Appellate Body has stated that applying the AD standard 
in the context of a dispute arising under the SPS Agreement would 
alter a “finely drawn balance” between “the jurisdictional 
competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the 
jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for 
themselves.”171  Despite the avowed respect for the Members’ 
retained competencies and the recognition of the AD Agreement’s 
special standard, the Appellate Body has not applied the more 
deferential review required in actual AD disputes.172   
 In its initial decisions involving the AD Agreement, the panels 
and the Appellate Body either made token references to or articulated 
views that diluted the impact of the Article 17.6 standard.  In fact, in 
its first AD decision, the Appellate Body held that the AD and the 
DSU standards “complement[ ] each other.”173  The Appellate Body 
explained that the DSU standard also governs the analysis in AD 
cases unless adherence to the DSU standard leads to a “conflict” 
between the provisions of the DSU and the AD Agreement.174  Thus, 
rather than controlling in every AD dispute, the Article 17.6 standard 
is construed as serving an auxiliary role to the less deferential DSU 
standard, and, therefore, only governs review of AD decisions in 
situations where the adjudicator would reach conflicting decisions 
under the two standards.175  Yet, the ordinary meaning of the DSU 
provision quoted by the Appellate Body does not support this 
interpretation.  Specifically, DSU Article 1.2 provides that “[t]o the 
extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of 
this Understanding . . . the special or additional rules and procedures 
in Appendix 2 shall prevail.”176  Appendix 2 lists AD Agreement 
Article 17.6 as one such special rule.177  Since the DSU expressly 
recognizes a difference between the AD Agreement standard and its 
own general standard and requires application of the “special or 
additional rule” as the rule that “shall prevail,”178 one wonders why 
                                                                                                                      
 169. US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶ 47. 
 170. EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 36, ¶ 114.  
 171. Id. ¶ 115. 
 172. DSU Article 11 provides the standard of review otherwise applicable to 
disputes arising under the other agreements. DSU, supra note 7, art. 11. Under this 
standard, a panel is required to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it,” 
and is not bound to extend the greater deference afforded under the AD Standard. Id. 
 173. Guatemala—Cement, supra note 149, ¶ 65. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. ¶ 66. 
 176. DSU, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. app. 2. 
 178. Id. art. 1.2. 
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the Appellate Body interposed the occurrence of a conflict as the 
requirement for exclusive application of the AD standard.  The plain 
language of DSU Article 1.2 requires the adjudicator to apply the AD 
standard as the controlling authority; the DSU standard does not 
apply.  By interjecting the requirement of a conflict between the two 
standards, the Appellate Body not only contradicted the letter of the 
DSU, but also diluted the impact of the AD standard.   
3. Conflation of the AD Standard with the DSU Standard 
 The WTO adjudicators’ tendency to interpret WTO law in a way 
that dilutes the AD standard has also manifested itself in their 
conflation of Article 17.6(i)’s call to “determine whether the 
authorities’ . . . evaluation [of the facts] was unbiased and 
objective”179 with the DSU Article 11 requirement to “make an 
objective assessment.”180  In applying DSU Article 11’s “objective 
assessment” simultaneously with the Article 17.6(i) standard, the 
panel in Egypt–Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar 
from Turkey (Egypt–Steel Rebar) suggested that agencies’ factual 
determinations are subject to a more intrusive review than the 
Article 17.6(i) standard seems to authorize.181  Early in its report, the 
panel stated that fact-finding is “‘always constrained by the mandate 
of Article 11 of the DSU.’”182  Also, despite recognizing that “we 
should not involve ourselves in a de novo review of the facts,” the 
panel “deem[ed] it necessary to undertake a detailed review of the 
evidence submitted [to the agency].”183  The panel’s detailed review of 
the evidence involved a thorough examination of the administrative 
record, including an extensive analysis of the responses submitted by 
each investigated company and the agency’s reactions to these 
responses.184  Thus, the panel reviewed the evidence as if DSU Article 
11 controlled.   
 By applying the DSU standard where it cannot apply,185 the 
Egypt–Steel Rebar panel conflated the two standards and minimized 
all distinctions between them.  Moreover, the panel’s analysis under 
the DSU standard approaches, and is perhaps identical to, the de 
novo standard of review it recognized as improper under Article 
17.6(i).  More importantly, this approach effectively eliminates the 
possibility of considering antidumping authorities’ factual 
                                                                                                                      
 179. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 17.6(i). 
 180. DSU, supra note 7, art. 11. 
 181. Egypt—Steel Rebar, supra note 149, ¶¶ 7.9, 7.14.  
 182. Id. ¶ 7.11. 
 183. Id. ¶ 7.14 (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. ¶¶ 7.165–.266. 
 185. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 1.2, app. 2. 
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determinations under the more deferential purview of the AD 
Agreement.186   
 As exemplified in each of these cases, whether through specious 
definitions of terms contained in the AD Agreement’s factual and 
legal standards, through the creation of artificial and unwarranted 
tests, or through the conflation of the DSU and AD standards, WTO 
adjudicators have severely diminished the level of deference owed to 
Respondents’ agencies under the AD Agreement as negotiated by 
WTO members.  This systematic erosion of the AD standards 
illustrates a pattern of rule development that not only constitutes 
what several scholars have characterized as “judicial activism,”187 but 
also exhibits a pro-Complainant bias.  The existence of a Respondent-
deferential standard and the absence of any evidence indicating that 
Respondents engage in more egregious violations of the AD 
Agreement than other WTO agreements suggest that the high rate of 
Complainant success (and Respondent loss) in AD litigation follows 
from the evisceration of the standard.  This bias explains the high 
rate of Complainant success. 
 This normative evolution of rules with a systematic pro-
Complainant bias would have a limited explanatory scope if it were 
restricted to the particular context of AD adjudication.  However, 
because activist adjudicators are not likely to restrict their activism 
to a particular area of the law, one would expect biased rule 
development to transcend case categories and thus serve as an 
explanation for the generally asymmetric nature of WTO outcomes.  
The following subpart presents a set of cases that illustrate a pattern 
of biased rule development occurring outside the context of AD 
disputes.   
B.  Biased Rule Development in the Inconsistent Use of Declarations 
 The Appellate Body’s use of declarations contained in WTO 
documents and in other international treaties illustrates yet another 
method of developing WTO law in Complainants’ favor.  The 
Appellate Body has been inconsistent in interpreting and giving effect 
to declarations, or general proclamations made by parties in 
connection with an agreement but not contained within the statutory 
terms of the agreement itself.  This lack of general coherence also 
                                                                                                                      
 186. That the panel upheld most of the agency’s findings in this dispute does not 
diminish the point that the panel, relying on Appellate Body precedent, had engaged in 
the kind of intrusive review that defies the level of deference mandated by the Article 
17.6(i) standard.   
 187. Ragosta et al., supra note 17, at 748–50; see also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, 
FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WTO 42 (2001) 
(stating that the Appellate Body is legislating instead of interpreting the law); 
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 152, at 130 (referring to more recent cases). 
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coincides with the Complainant–Respondent divide in that the legal 
significance given to declarations in a particular case seems to 
correlate with the interests of the Complainants.  The following cases 
illustrate that the Appellate Body’s inconsistent treatment of 
declarations has restricted Respondents’ discretion beyond the 
domain of AD law.   
1. Interpretation of “Pro-Respondent” Declarations as Merely 
Hortatory 
 In United States–Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in 
the United Kingdom (US–Leaded Bar), the Respondent argued that 
the AD Agreement’s standard of review applied to WTO analysis of 
countervailing duty measures covered by the SCM Agreement.  
Despite recognizing that the SCM Agreement contains no specific 
standard of review, the U.S. availed itself of a Ministerial Declaration 
that seemingly communicated the ministers’ intent to extend the AD 
Agreement’s standard of review to disputes arising under the SCM 
Agreement.188  Specifically, the Declaration provides that the 
Ministers recognize, with respect to dispute settlement pursuant to the 
[AD] Agreement . . . or . . . the [SCM] Agreement . . . the need for the 
consistent resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty measures.189   
 The U.S. argued that the declaration not only expressed the 
“clear intent of the Ministers to apply the [AD] standard of review” to 
subsidy disputes, but also "create[d] binding obligations.”190  Thus, 
according to the U.S., the panel “erred in applying the [DSU] 
standard . . . rather than the standard . . . set forth in [the AD] 
Agreement.”191  Finding that the SCM Agreement “does not contain 
any ‘special or additional rules’ on the standard of review to be 
applied,”192 the Appellate Body ruled that the declaration could not 
“impose an obligation to apply” the AD standard of review.193  Rather, 
the declaration contained “hortatory language,” exemplified by the 
use of the term “recognize,” which, in the Appellate Body’s view, was 
not a command, but “merely acknowledge[d] ‘the need for the 
                                                                                                                      
 188. US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶¶ 45, 48.  
 189. World Trade Organization, Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to 
the Agreement on Implementation of VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
LT/UR/DEC-2/1 (1994) [hereinafter AD Ministerial Declaration]. 
 190. US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶ 10. 
 191. Id. ¶ 44. 
 192. Id. ¶ 45. 
 193. Id. ¶ 49. 
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consistent resolution of [AD and CVD] disputes.”194  This language 
seems to indicate that, as far as declarations are concerned, the 
Appellate Body adhered to a strict constructionist approach.  They 
also signal that the Appellate Body construed declarations couched in 
similar words as no more than aspirational.  Perhaps this explains 
why the Appellate Body did not articulate how not applying the same 
standards of review to the two types of disputes would lead to their 
“consistent resolution,” a goal that the declaration “merely 
acknowledge[d].”  Thus, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s 
application of the less Respondent-deferential DSU standard.   
 However, when it had previously considered “hortatory” 
language contained in another WTO document and in a set of non-
WTO international agreements, the Appellate Body reached beyond 
their aspirational content, choosing to give similarly worded 
declarations binding effect.  In doing so, the Appellate Body 
effectively limited the scope of Respondent’s regulatory conduct, 
which it viewed as impermissibly restricting trade.   
2. Interpretation of “Pro-Complainant” Declarations as More than 
Hortatory 
 In United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (US–Shrimp/Turtle), the Appellate Body struck 
down U.S. legislation designed to limit the incidental taking of sea 
turtles in the process of shrimp harvesting, finding that it violated 
GATT Article XX’s criteria against arbitrary and unjustified 
discrimination.195  U.S. regulations had banned the import of shrimp 
from countries that failed to show “a credible enforcement record” of 
the use of turtle-excluder devices (TEDs) similar to that imposed on 
the U.S. domestic shrimp industry.196  While never disputing that its 
import ban was a violation of GATT Article XI’s prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions, the U.S. argued that these measures 
intended to promote the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource and, as such, were excepted under GATT Article XX(g).197   
 The Appellate Body agreed that the challenged measures were 
indeed within the exception198 but found them impermissible because 
they had been implemented “in a manner which constituted arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the WTO, 
contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.”199  
Specifically, the Appellate Body faulted the U.S. for securing 
                                                                                                                      
 194. Id. (quoting AD Ministerial Declaration, supra note 189). 
 195. US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 186.  
 196. See id. ¶ 162. 
 197. See id. ¶ 25. 
 198. Id. ¶ 145. 
 199. Id. ¶ 186. 
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agreements with some but not all shrimp-exporting members, which 
resulted in their differential and thus “discriminatory” treatment.200  
Despite U.S. protests that “it had offered to negotiate but 
Complainants [India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand] did not 
reply,”201 the Appellate Body, following the panel below, “did not find 
it necessary to examine whether [the U.S. and the Complaining] 
parties entered into negotiations in good faith.”202  Rather, the 
Appellate Body relied heavily on the notion that the U.S. was 
obligated to engage in “serious, across-the-board negotiations with 
the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements . . . 
before enforcing the import prohibition.”203  The Appellate Body based 
this obligation on the “need” for “concerted and cooperative efforts,” 
which had been recognized in prior WTO declarations and other 
international instruments regarding the environment.204   
 Yet, not unlike the declaration referenced in US–Leaded Bar, 
these declarations were couched in otherwise “hortatory” language.205  
For instance, the preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO 
(WTO Agreement), which the Appellate Body quoted, states: 
The Parties to this Agreement, 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living . . . while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment . . . . 
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated . . . multilateral trading 
system . . . .206 
                                                                                                                      
 200. Id. ¶ 167. 
 201. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, § VII(E)(2), ¶ 7.54, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter US—
Shrimp Turtle Panel Report]. 
 202. US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 166 (quoting the US—Shrimp Turtle 
Panel Report, supra note 201, ¶ 7.56). 
 203. US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 166 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
Appellate Body attached great significance to the fact that the creation of the 
regulatory scheme preceded the unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. to enter into an 
agreement with the Complainants. While the perception of U.S. unilateralism may 
have contributed to the lack of success in convincing the Complainants to enter an 
agreement, the preexistence of the TED requirement by itself hardly constitutes 
evidence that the U.S. had not tried to negotiate in good faith with the Complainants. 
In fact, the Appellate Body itself recognized that the U.S. had entered into the 1996 
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. See id. 
¶ 171. Remarkably, however, the Appellate Body construed such success against the 
Respondent, indicating that the existence of the Convention “provide[d] convincing 
demonstration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the USA.” 
Id.   
 204. Id. ¶ 168. 
 205. US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶ 49. 
 206. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl., 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
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To the Appellate Body, this preambular language “reflect[ed] the 
intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement,” and thus “must add 
color, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements 
annexed to the WTO Agreement.”207  The interpretation the Appellate 
Body eventually gave to the chapeau of Article XX imposed on 
members an obligation to exhaust multilateral avenues before 
enacting a conservation scheme that might present obstacles to trade.  
That obligation, however, is found nowhere in the WTO agreements.  
A member is entitled to avail itself of any of the enumerated 
exceptions under Article XX and does not necessarily engage in 
arbitrary or discriminatory conduct when it pursues a regulatory 
course that precedes negotiation of a multilateral agreement.208  In 
fact, Article XX owes its existence to members’ desire to retain such 
jurisdictional competencies by reserving themselves the right to 
deviate from WTO general principles under particular circumstances.  
Although vowing to “protect and preserve the environment” in 
prefatory language,209 members did not enter into any express or 
implicit obligation to proceed multilaterally as a matter of WTO law.   
 In fairness, the Appellate Body did not rely solely on this 
prefatory language but on a growing number of international legal 
instruments that together express the growing consensus for 
multilateral action.  Indeed, the Appellate Body quoted four other 
non-WTO declarations: the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles (Inter-American Convention), the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.210  Despite 
references in some of these treaties to members’ obligations under 
different WTO Agreements,211 none of these treaties create binding 
obligations as a matter of WTO law.  As Article 1.1 of the DSU 
provides, the rules and procedures of the DSU, the WTO Agreement, 
and the other covered agreements are the law that WTO adjudicators 
“shall apply to [WTO] disputes.”212  No express or implicit provision 
in these WTO agreements authorizes resort to substantive public 
international law.  In fact, the call of DSU Article 3.2 for WTO 
adjudicators “to clarify the existing provisions of [the] agreements” 
                                                                                                                      
 207. US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 153. The Appellate Body also 
referred to language in the Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, which 
“endorsed and supported . . . ‘multilateral solutions based on international cooperation 
and consensus as the best and most effective way for governments to tackle 
environmental problems of a transboundary or global nature.’” Id. ¶ 168. 
 208. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(d). 
 209. WTO Agreement, supra note 206, pmbl. 
 210. US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 130, 168–70. 
 211. Id. ¶ 169 (quoting Inter-American Convention on the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles art. XV, Dec. 1, 1996, 37 I.L.M. 1246). 
 212. DSU, supra note 7, art. 1(1). 
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expressly circumscribes hermeneutic activity to “customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law,” not in any way endorsing 
the application of substantive provisions of non-WTO international 
law.213  That the Vienna Convention calls for the consideration of 
non-WTO international norms in the interpretation of ambiguous 
WTO terms does not amount to an authorization to construe those 
extrinsic norms as giving rise to WTO obligations in and of 
themselves.214   
 Although there is much to be said for the need for 
multilateralism in environmental conservation as well as other 
transnational issues, none of the declarations or binding 
commitments contained in these non-WTO agreements should have 
been used by the Appellate Body to “mark[] out the equilibrium line” 
between members rights and obligations.215  In doing so, the 
Appellate Body used the words of these non-WTO authorities to 
impute to the chapeau of Article XX concepts that were not intended.  
In fact, the Appellate Body gave these non-WTO substantive 
instruments binding effect, as confirmed by the Appellate Body’s 
language in the subsequent compliance case brought by Malaysia.216  
In concluding that the Respondent had complied with its ruling in the 
underlying dispute, the Appellate Body explained: 
[G]iven the decided preference for multilateral approaches voiced by 
WTO Members and others in the international community in various 
international agreements for the protection and conservation of 
endangered sea turtles that were cited in our previous Report, the 
United States, in our view, would be expected to make good faith efforts 
to reach international agreements that are comparable from one form of 
negotiation to the other.217 
Thus, the Appellate Body, in its own words, used non-WTO 
substantive law to craft and enforce an entirely new obligation on a 
Respondent.218   
                                                                                                                      
 213. DSU, supra note 7, art. 3(2) (emphasis added). 
 214. See Vienna Convention, supra note 165, art. 31(3)(c) (“There shall be taken 
into account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.”). 
 215. See US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 170. 
 216. US—Shrimp/Turtle Compliance, supra note 113 (explaining the Appellate 
Body’s review of Malaysia’s complaint that United States failed to make good-faith 
efforts to negotiate with it before banning the importation of certain shrimp from 
Malaysia). 
 217. Id. ¶ 122 (emphasis added).   
 218. For a similar endorsement of giving binding effect to substantive public 
international law in WTO disputes, see Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting 
Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, WT/DS163/R (June 19, 2000), in which the Panel 
states that: 
Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations 
between the WTO Members. Such international law applies . . . to the extent 
there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO 
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 As far as this analysis of WTO rule development is concerned, 
the unauthorized resort to substantive public international law, while 
troubling, is not the most revealing aspect of US–Shrimp/Turtle.  
Rather, the use of declarations expressed in WTO documents is the 
better illustration of the Appellate Body’s tendency to evolve WTO 
law to the detriment of Respondents.  That the Appellate Body could 
construe one declaration—the preambular declaration—as creating 
an obligation upon members and interpret similar language in 
another—the standard-of-review declaration—as no more than an 
aspiration, demonstrates an inconsistent attitude not found in 
unbiased adjudicators.  To detect this inconsistency, one need neither 
disagree with the Appellate Body’s ruling that the U.S. afforded 
differential and, thus, discriminatory treatment to the Complainants 
in this case, nor with the Appellate Body’s ruling in US–Leaded 
Bar.219  One need only observe the different reading the Appellate 
Body gave to declarations in US–Shrimp/Turtle and, later, in US–
Leaded Bar.  Both declarations express the intent of the same 
negotiators, during the same round of negotiations, with similar 
language.  In US–Shrimp/Turtle, however, the pertinent 
declarations, which favored Complainants, were given binding effect.   
C.  Biased Rule Development: From Localized Patterns to an All-
Encompassing Activist Jurisprudence 
 The cases discussed in Parts VI.A and VI.B show how WTO 
adjudicators have consistently deployed interpretive methods that 
produce a consistent outcome: restricting Respondent discretion to 
adopt otherwise trade-restrictive measures, and thus furthering the 
promotion of an unfettered version of trade.  While free trade itself is 
the noble goal on which the entire WTO edifice is erected—a goal that 
is not controverted by this Article—its pursuit is disciplined by a set 
of agreements that demarcate what constitutes permissible conduct 
under a self-contained system of laws.  As described above and as the 
overall asymmetric pattern of Complainant and Respondent Success 
Rates suggests, WTO litigators have adopted a pro-trade adjudicatory 
                                                                                                                      
agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules 
of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty 
formation under the WTO. 
Id. 
 219. Indeed, the holding of the case—that measures prohibiting the importation 
of shrimp harvested by methods that kill sea turtles qualify as WTO-compliant, even 
when discriminatory, so long as they are not applied in an arbitrary and unjustified 
manner—could hardly be interpreted as anti-Respondent. Rather, what seems 
problematic is the Appellate Body’s finding that Respondent’s application of the TED 
measures constituted arbitrary and unjustified discrimination due to Respondent’s 
“failure” to negotiate a multilateral agreement that included the Complainants on the 
assumption that Respondent was so obligated on the basis of declaratory language.   
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philosophy that sacrifices Respondents’ jurisdictional competencies.  
This adjudicatory philosophy has manifested itself in two major types 
of case dispositions: reducing Respondents’ rights under the 
agreements (e.g., nullifying the Respondent-deferential AD standard 
by capriciously interpreting its terms, applying the DSU standard 
where the more deferential AD standard controls, conflating the two 
standards into an amorphous de novo standard, and giving no effect 
to declarations that would presumably favor Respondents) and 
creating Respondent obligations where none previously existed (e.g., 
creating extraneous, non-contemporaneous tests to gauge 
Respondents’ conduct during investigations, finding an obligation to 
engage in multilateral negotiations before instituting regulations, 
and using non-WTO obligations to test a Respondent’s good faith).  As 
the Appellate Body has acted in a manner that consistently reduces 
Respondents’ regulatory discretion, it has produced a jurisprudence 
that privileges trade liberalization at the expense of the reservations 
members made through the negotiating process.  By producing a 
jurisprudence that “clarif[ies] the existing provisions of [the] 
agreements” consistently in one direction, WTO adjudicators have 
failed to “preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements.”220   
 However, in describing the task of clarifying the provisions of the 
WTO agreements, trade scholars have often used neutral terms to 
characterize this process, such as filling in gaps,221 “completing the 
analysis,”222 or “clarifying ambiguity,”223 which describe the 
otherwise normal and uncontroversial operation of impartial 
adjudicators in applying abstract norms to concrete cases.  Use of 
these neutral terms might be justified because most analyses focus on 
a limited number of disputes, a method that does not permit the 
detection of broader, case-transcending trends that reveal the 
                                                                                                                      
 220. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 3(2). 
 221. Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623, 
638 (2006) (explaining that WTO adjudicators are required to fill in gaps in cases 
involving matters either unconsidered or unresolved by negotiators and stating that 
the Appellate Body “has been prudent and has avoided extensive ‘judicial legislation’”); 
see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: 
Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 617 (2002) (stating that Appellate Body was at 
times “confronted with a ‘gap,’ i.e., an issue apparently not addressed by the covered 
agreement, but which [has] to be decided nevertheless”). 
 222. Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body 
Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power, in THE ROLE OF THE 
JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, 11, 17 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. 
Mavroidis eds., 2003) (quoting the Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 
29, 1996)).   
 223. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 252 (2004). 
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systematic pro-Complainant nature of this jurisprudence.  Still, these 
scholars raise cautionary notes about the Appellate Body’s authority 
to craft principles of WTO law.  For instance, while Deborah Cass 
argues that WTO adjudicators are generating a body of law perhaps 
best understood through a constitutional lens, she cautions that “the 
international trade ‘constitutionalization project’ should take more 
seriously the powerful and insistent claims of legitimacy, democracy 
(of both substance and form) and community.”224   
 Indeed, many international trade law scholars have addressed 
the inherent dangers of using a judicial process to generate new rules 
and procedures,225 especially because this adjudicative activity 
generates ex post facto rules and standards.226  Giving broad 
interpretive—and even legislative—authority to the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system transfers decisional power to a select few WTO 
panelists and Appellate Body members, when it is clear that the 
intention of the WTO members was to reserve the power to adopt new 
binding interpretations to the Ministerial Conference and to make 
new law only via the treaty amendment process.227  The creation of 
an ambitious body of law teleologically bound to an activist, liberal 
view of trade that reaches beyond the set of negotiated bargains 
significantly strains the considered original will of the WTO 
members.  In the absence of institutions that can both serve as a 
check on judicial lawmaking and “be accountable for the policy and 
value tradeoffs” involved in making teleological choices, WTO 
                                                                                                                      
 224. DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING SYSTEM 246 (2005); see also Deborah Z. Cass, The “Constitutionalization” of 
International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional 
Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L 39, 72 (2001) 
(“[C]onstitutionalalization practice described here . . . contains within some difficult 
debates about trade liberalization and globalization, and legitimacy, democracy and 
international order, about how legal systems are made, and by whom.”). 
 225. See Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO—Strategies to Cope 
with a Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 609, 611 (2001) (arguing that 
there is a deficient relationship between the political and adjudicative functions of the 
WTO); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the 
Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 664 (2006) (“The paradox is 
that constitutionalism . . . cannot possibly deliver the escape from politics that it 
promises.”); Rahul Singh, The World Trade Organization and Legitimacy: Evolving a 
Framework for Bridging the Democratic Deficit, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 347, 352–54 (2008) 
(testing the legitimacy of the WTO’s law making apparatus); Trachtman, supra note 
221, at 637 (“These types of quasi-legislation, delegated by the WTO to these other 
bodies, present important questions about democratic accountability.”). 
 226. Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 412 
(2000). 
 227. See WTO Agreement, supra note 206, art. IX(2), X (“Ministerial Conference 
and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of 
this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”); see also von Bogdandy, 
supra note 225, at 628 (“Article X:8 WTO provides the competence for autonomous 
rulemaking with regard to the dispute settlement procedures.”). 
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adjudicators should exercise judicial restraint.228  Simply put, there is 
no WTO demos or democratic community whose will WTO 
adjudicators can validly express.229  However laudable the 
development of a jurisprudence that embraces predictability through 
judicial lawmaking may be, the creation of nonnegotiated obligations 
under the guise of interpreting negotiated agreements is antithetical 
to the basic principle that what sovereign states have not specifically 
promised to do cannot be legally required of them.230   
 Granted, the adoption of a philosophically more modest 
jurisprudence that is cognizant of the value of domestic regulations in 
a multilateral trade regime but that still permits a great deal of 
regulatory diversity involves striking a difficult balance.  In their 
quest to create a unifying trade regime, members recognized the 
value in experimenting with alternative rules suited to their 
individual needs, even at the cost of sacrificing trade.  This 
recognition is evident, for instance, in the subject-matter exceptions 
of GATT Article XX.  Though tempered by restrictions against 
arbitrary enforcement, these exceptions exist to protect the 
regulatory diversity that itself mirrors “the values and norms that 
shape” members’ different societies.231  Thus, more sensitivity to 
Respondents’ sovereign rights, as the Appellate Body demonstrated in 
the early EC–Beef Hormones case, need not be equated with total 
deference, as the result of the case suggests.232  However, if such 
sensitivity were extended throughout the domain of WTO litigation, it 
is unlikely that the balance of outcomes would be so one-sided.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 The problem that activism poses is not merely one of lack of 
democratic checks, which is itself a very serious problem, but the fact 
that such activism is occurring within the domain of a rules-based 
system.  A rules-based system is antithetical to activism, especially 
one that creates consistently one-sided jurisprudence by eroding 
                                                                                                                      
 228. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy through “Higher Law”? 
Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 307, 309 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis 
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Respondents’ rights and increasing Respondents’ obligations.  The 
argument that WTO adjudicators have embarked on a project to curb 
national authorities’ power to engage in actions inconsistent with a 
liberal view of international trade involves more than a debate on the 
merits of comparative advantage.  Determining whether this 
adjudicatory mechanism does what it is legally required to do is 
critical to the preservation of a system founded on negotiated rules.   
 While the perception that the WTO system is operating under a 
single coherent philosophical force is widely discussed in current 
WTO literature, until this study there had been no demonstration of 
just how far-reaching an asymmetric pattern of decision making has 
materialized in the collective repertoire of WTO decisions.  The 
existence of a sustained pattern of Complainant success, with win 
rates ranging from 83% to 91% across Case Types, constitutes a 
substantial deviation from the 50% success rate predicted under 
random litigation assumptions.  This systematic outcome asymmetry 
defied several alternative explanations, such as case selection, 
settlement constraints, information and stake asymmetries, 
Complainants’ desire to make law, and supposed weakness in 
Respondents’ cases.  Rather, the outcome asymmetry is more 
parsimoniously explained by a normative evolution that consistently 
construes WTO law against Respondents by either curtailing their 
reserved rights or creating new obligations under the covered 
agreements or even beyond WTO law.   
 To reach these conclusions, this study went beyond an analysis 
of the relative success rates of Complainants and Respondents and 
attempted to identify patterns in the type of law created.  Rather 
than focusing solely on who won each dispute, it considered whether 
precedent-creating decisions favored a particular type of litigant.  
Such decisions more often than not seemed to rest on particular 
teleological interpretations assumed by adjudicators and not on the 
quality of the litigants’ arguments.  Because these interpretations 
neatly fell on one side of the Complainant–Respondent divide, the 
study was able to establish a link between adjudicatory lawmaking 
and the empirically and anecdotally established asymmetrical 
pattern of outcomes.  By calling attention to this extreme pattern of 
decisions, this Article seeks to further the discussion of democratic 
legitimacy and legality, so that academics, WTO adjudicators, 
politicians, and trade constituencies might more fully understand the 
implications and consequences of the system they have created and 
continue to perpetuate. 
